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RFID AND OTHER EMBEDDED TECHNOLOGIES:
WHO OWNS THE DATA?
Lars S. Smitht
INTRODUCTION
You have just purchased an item of tangible personal property-
a car, a refrigerator, or a new shirt. You own the item, of course,
because under U.C.C. Article 2, when you pay consideration to the
seller, title transfers to you.
Although you are the owner of the item, the manufacturer (or
possibly the distributor) has placed devices on the item to help the
manufacturer track the item. This is generally referred to as
automated identification technologies (Auto-ID).' You are aware and
probably approve of the use of bar codes, because they speed up the
process of buying the item. Although you probably do not give it
much thought, you usually throw away the packaging that contains
the bar code, and so there is no risk that your use of the item can be
tracked at a later date.
However, because of the need for human intervention and the
potential for errors in capturing data, bar codes are not the best way to
track an item through the distribution system. Barcodes must be
scanned by a laser, which requires them to be within the line of sight
of the scanner. Instead, the distributor, a major international retailer
with the clout to make demands on its suppliers, now insists that a
new form of Auto-ID be placed on the item, one that requires no
t Assistant Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of
Louisville. I am grateful for the many suggestions I received at the Santa Clara Computer &
High Technology Law Journal symposium, Privacy in the Information Age, Jan. 27, 2006,
where this article was first presented. In particular, I wish to thank Dorothy Glancy, Sonia
Katyal, and Nicole Ozer, who took the time to provide in depth comments as members of the
panel at the symposium. I would also like to thank Auric Steele and Robyn Lurding for their
invaluable assistance in researching this article.
1. Mark Roberti, What is RFID, RFID JOURNAL,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1339/l/129 (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). Also
known as AIDC, see Automated Identification and Data Capture,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Automatedidentification-and data-capture&oldid=4
7550267.
696 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.,. [Vol. 22
human intervention to read, and can be tracked down to the individual
item anywhere along the supply chain-a radio frequency
identification tag (RFID tag).2
These RFID tags, or just tags, can be quite small. A tag requires
no direct human interaction to operate, can be activated remotely by
radio transmissions, and can broadcast its signal through walls. In
addition, the system is designed so that each tag has a unique
identification code, allowing the merchant to distinguish between
individual items containing tags. It's so unobtrusive that you the
consumer do not even notice that your sweater has a tag attached to
the collar. The tag may even allow the retailer to collect information
about the item, such as where it has been anywhere on the globe, how
it has been operated, and any other information tracked by sensors
built into the tag. If the tag is embedded in your car, the amount of
information tracked could be quite extensive. If the tag is more
sophisticated, it may also have its own power source, which gives it
the ability to store data about your location, the use of the item in
which it is embedded, and any other piece of information the
manufacturer can track through the tag. Should you care? And whose
information is it, anyway?
At the moment, this technology is primarily being used for
inventory control at the distribution level, with the tags being placed
on containers and packages.3 This allows major retailers to follow the
product all the way through the supply chain, from the manufacturers'
warehouses to the retailers' stores. Wal-Mart, for example, is
requiring its one hundred largest suppliers to place an RFID tag on all
palettes of products, which Wal-Mart has found can reduce out-of-
stocks by as much sixteen percent. 4
More sophisticated applications may be on the horizon. Hitachi
has produced an RFID tag the size of a grain of sand, making item
level tagging a distinct possibility. Industry proponents promote the
2. Wal-Mart is one of the leading proponents of this technology. See Tutorial-
Reports.Com, Wal-Mart and RFID: A Case Study,
http://www.tutorial-reports.com/wireless/rfid/walmart/expectations.php.
3. RFID 101 The Future Is Here: A Beginner's Guide to RFID (June 28, 2004), RFID
GAZETTE, http://www.rfidgazette.org/2004/06/rfid_101.html ("The main application for this
today is tracking products along a supply chain."). While such "supply chain management" is a
large part of current RFID uses, RFID systems have been installed in other areas, such as asset
management, tracking parts during manufacturing, and payment systems. Getting Started RFID
Business Applications, REID JOURNAL,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/l334/l/129.
4. Mark Roberti, EPC Reduces Out-of-Stocks at Wal-Mart, RFID JOURNAL, Oct. 14,
2005, available at http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/I 927/- 1/1/.
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technology as providing a wide variety of benefits to businesses 5 and
consumers. 6  However, even if the technological challenges are
overcome, it will likely be some time before the economics make
sense.
7
This article will explore the extent to which someone can own or
control the information contained on the tag, and who that person is.
Part I will discuss the technology-both currently available and under
development-for implementing RFID. Part II will discuss direct
ownership of the data contained on the tag under such theories as
copyright law. Part III will discuss ownership of the data through
ownership of the hardware. Part IV will discuss how a manufacturer
might be able to control access to the data, even where it does not
own the data or the hardware. While there are many interesting
privacy issues related to RFID technology and tracking of personal
information by companies and the government,8 this article will focus
on issues of ownership of the information contained on the chip.
I. THE TECHNOLOGY
The legal concerns discussed in this article are raised by the
development of several different technologies: first, the development
of "smart goods"; second, the miniaturization of computer
technology; and third, the development of real time automatic
tracking technology.
The concept of a "smart good" involves the merger of traditional
manufactured goods with information technology by way of the
inclusion of computer technology in goods other than computers. The
typical example is that of the automobile, which in many cases has
5. Mark Roberti, Getting Started RFID Business Applications, RFID JOURNAL,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/1334/1/129/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
6. Mark Roberti, Getting Started RFID Consumer Applications and Benefits, RFID
JOURNAL, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1332/l/129/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2006).
7. Currently, passive tags are estimated to cost between 20¢ and 40¢ a piece, and active
tags between $20 and $50. See Getting Started RFID System Components and Costs, RFID
JOURNAL, http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/1336/l/129/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2006).
8. See, e.g., Gal Eschet, Fips And Pets For Rfid." Protecting Privacy In The Web Of
Radio Frequency Identification,45 JURIMETRICS J. 301 (2005); John M. Eden, When Big
Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, The Privacy Act Of 1974, And The Future Of
Rfid, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20 (2005); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing:
Embedding The Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93 (2005).
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dozens of onboard computers.9 Another example would be a
refrigerator with a built-in bar code scanner, which allows you to
generate a digital shopping list by scanning containers as you are
about to finish the item. The refrigerator would then send the list to
your grocery store, which would have your groceries ready for you to
pick up. 10
The computers in cars not only monitor the operations of the car,
but can also track information about the use of the car. For example,
the Lotus Elise sports car has a component, referred to as the "engine
control unit," which can track over time various engine statistics, such
as revolutions per minute.11 While clearly this helps the dealer
maintain the car, it may also be used to see if the engine has been
misused. 12 One owner of a Lotus Elise sports car had the dealer
download the data for him summarizing the first 1,000 miles of use of
the car. 13 He noted that the data contained information about the car's
operation that was inconsistent with how he had driven the car. 14
At the same time, computer chips are getting smaller. 15 This
drive to reduce size is in part due to manufacturers' desires to meet
9. Abby J. Hardwick, Amending The Uniform Commercial Code: How Will A Change In
Scope Alter The Concept Of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 288 (2004). See also U.C.C. § 2-
103 cmt. 7 (2005) ("For example, the sale of 'smart goods' such as an automobile is a
transaction in goods fully within this article even though the automobile contains many
computer programs"); Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and
your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart
Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y. 241 (2002).
10. Leander Kahney, The Coolest Internet Appliance, WIRED, Feb. 12, 1999,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0, 1 7894-0.html.
11. Robert Collingridge, Lotus Elise S2 Engine Control Unit,
http://www.elises.co.uk/components/s2/engine/ecu/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006):
The engine management system has been specified to include memory which
Lotus intend to use for a future upgrade that will provide a data-logging facility
for use on the track. At present this memory is used to gather data needed to
onward develop the OBD system. There is also a 'snap-shot' logging facility
which records the sensor outputs at the moment a fault is triggered to aid
diagnosis by a dealer.
12. Id. ("There is no 'black-box' system for accident investigation but, the data captured
can be used by Lotus to check on how the car has been used during it's life. This information
could be used to decide whether a warranty claim isjustified or not." (emphasis added)).
13. Lotus Elise: Engine Control Unit Information (last updated Oct. 2004),
http://www.sandsmuseum.com/cars/elise/information/misc/ecudump.html.
14. Id. ("The Max Engine Speed shows three recordings of greater than 8000 rpm. I know
I did not do that, and the car only had 8 miles on it when I picked it up. So I am not sure when
the engine encountered these high revs.").
15. Chris Nuttall, IBM set to unveil its skinniest microchip, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 2982886 ("IBM says its researchers have made a breakthrough in
reducing the width of circuits on silicon chips to less than 30 billionths of a metre.").
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consumer demand for smart goods. 16 This is also true in the field of
radio frequency identification. Hitachi has developed an RFID tag
that is so small it can be woven into currency. 17 Impinj, Inc. markets a
chip, called the Zuma, which is the size of a grain of sand, has 41,798
transistors, and is comparable to the original Intel 8086
microprocessor. 18 Impinj describes the chip as a "[e]ssentially a
microprocessor with an RF interface and nonvolatile memory."19
The final ingredient-leading to the raising of legal concerns-is
the development of item level tracking. The technology behind this
capability will be discussed in greater detail in the section that
follows. However, one important aspect of RFID technology is the
ability of an RFID tag to store more than just an identification code.20
Thus, with the development of smart goods, the miniaturization of
microprocessors, and the ability to track and store information about
the goods to which the tag is attached, we are faced with the potential
for a ubiquitous, but hidden, technology that will be able to track and
store data about where we go and what we do.
A number of commentators have written about the tracking of
personal data, and the control of access to the use of that data, from a
privacy perspective. 21 This article considers whether the data itself is
owned or can be legally controlled by the manufacturer and the
consumer.
A. Embedded Tracking Technology
Radio frequency identification is a form of automatic
identification system, or Auto-ID. A leading journal describes Auto-
ID as "[a] broad term that covers methods of collecting data and
entering it directly into computer systems without human
16. Mike Fister, Consumers Drive R&D Focus To Low Power, Smaller Goods,
ELECTRONICS WEEKLY, Mar. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3439326 ("Consumers want
products that do a million different things and do them well, all in a tiny package with a battery
that never needs to be charged, and they will not wait for it.").
17. CRM News, Hitachi Develops Smallest IC Chip, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.crmbuyer.com/story/48693.html ("If an antenna is attached, the chip will still be
thinner than copy machine paper, and the information can be obtained without being touched.").
18. Rob Glidden, RF1D: The Next Big Little Thing, slide 16 (Oct. 7, 2004) available at
www.fcc.gov/realaudio/presentations/2004/100704/RobGlidden.pdf.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., ThingMagic, GENERATION 2, A USER GUIDE, at 12-13, (April, 2005),
available at www.thingmagic.combtml/Generation2%20-%20A%2User/2OGuide.pdf ("Class
2 tags add additional memory that can be changed frequently, for storing additional data - for
example from an onboard sensor.").
21. See notes 41-43 infra and accompanying text.
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involvement. '22 One example of Auto-ID that consumers are well
aware of is the bar code.23 Bar codes usually appear on the packaging
for a product. Manufacturers and retailers use the bar code to help
track the item in the supply chain, and to scan the product at
checkout. Bar codes often require a person to scan the item, and
generally do not contain individualized tracking information about the
particular item.
Manufacturers and retailers have been looking for a system to
provide automatic, real time, individualized tracking to better control
inventory distribution. Radio frequency identification is the
technology that is being developed to provide such a system.
1. RFID
RFID tags are part of a system for remotely storing and
retrieving data-in particular, identification information. 24 The RFID
system contains two major components: the RFID tag, the device that
stores and transmits the data, and the tag reader, the device that reads
the data off the RFID tag by way of radio transmission.25 The RFID
tag (tag) is the component that is attached to an item, allowing the
item to be tracked. The tag reader (reader) is the hardware that turns
on the tag, telling it to transmit data, which the reader then relays to
whomever is requesting it.26
The critical difference between bar codes, which provide
information about the contents of the package using the universal
product code (UPC), and RFID tags, is the electronic product code
(EPC). 27 The UPC includes information about the manufacturer and
the product type, but is not used to track individual items. By
comparison, the EPC additionally includes the individual serial
number of the item itself, facilitating the tracking of an individual
item that contains a tag.28 Currently, an organization called
22. RFID Journal, RFID Journal Glossary, available at
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/glossary/automatic%20identification (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
23. Id. ("Technologies normally considered part of auto-rD include bar codes, biometrics,
RFID and voice recognition.").
24. Reuven R. Levary, et al., Radio Frequency Identification: Legal Aspects, 12 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 6, 1 (2005), at http://Iaw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl2i2/article6.pdf.
25. KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS, 13-14 (Nelson Current 2005)
(hereinafter SPYCHIPS).
26. Id.
27. Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards: The Tip of the Retail Surveillance Iceberg,
79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 534, 561-62 (2002). See generally, SPYCHIPS, supra note 25.
28. EPCglobal: What is the Electronic Product Code,
http://www.epcglobalinc.org/about/faqs.html#7 (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
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EPCglobal, Inc., a non-profit joint venture of GS 1 (formerly known
as EAN International) and GS1 US (formerly the Uniform Code
Council, Inc.), is establishing the EPCglobal Network, a system that
allows for the global real-time, automatic identification of
information in the supply chain of any company, anywhere in the
world.29 EPCglobal has designed its tag numbering system to include
96 bits of data, which allows for 80 thousand trillion trillion
individual items to be tracked, 30 easily covering all manufactured
items for years to come. 31
What is the Electronic Product Code (EPC)?
The Electronic Product CodeTM (EPC) is the next generation of product
identification. The EPC is a simple, compact "license plate" that uniquely
identifies objects (items, cases, pallets, locations, etc.) in the supply chain. The
EPC is built around a basic hierarchical idea that can be used to express a wide
variety of different, existing numbering systems, like the EAN.UCC System
Keys, UID, VIN, and other numbering systems.
Like many current numbering schemes used in commerce, the EPC is divided
into numbers that identify the manufacturer and product type. But, the EPC uses
an extra set of digits, a serial number, to identify unique items. The EPC is the
key to the information about the product it identifies that exists in the EPCglobal
Network. An EPC number contains:
1. Header, which identifies the length, type, structure, version and
generation of EPC
2. Manager Number, which identifies the company or company entity
3. Object Class, similar to a stock keeping unit or SKU
4. Serial Number, which is the specific instance of the Object Class being
tagged
Additional fields may also be used as part of the EPC in order to properly encode
and decode information from different numbering systems into their native
(human-readable) forms.
29. About EPCglobal Inc, http://www.epcglobalinc.org/about/about.html (last visited Mar.
24, 2006).
30. DAVID L. BROCK, THE COMPACT ELECTRONIC PRODUCT CODE, A 64-BIT
REPRESENTATION OF THE ELECTRONIC PRODUCT CODE 4 (MIT Auto-ID Center Nov. 1, 2001),
available at http://www2.hkana.org/files/epcGlobal/paper/MIT-AUTO1D-WH-008.pdf, see
also, RFID Journal, The Electronic Product Code, http://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/23 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2006) ("The 96-bit EPC provides unique identifiers for 268 million companies.
Each manufacturer can have 16 million object classes and 68 billion serial numbers in each
class, more than enough to cover all products manufactured worldwide for years to come.").
The Electronic Product Code (EPC) was conceived as a means to identify all
physical objects. The primary purpose of the EPC was to serve as a reference to
networked information. Used in conjunction with the Object Name Service, the
EPC associates the physical object with information about the object - written in
the Physical Markup Language (PML). Together these components allow
physical objects to be networked together - creating essentially an 'Internet of
Things'.
Since the EPC identifies 'all physical objects,' it must be sufficiently large to
enumerate at least those objects of interest for purposes of tracking and
identification. The 96-bit version of the EPC code allows approximately 8x 1028,
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Tags come in two basic types: passive and active. A passive tag
has no power source, and is generally only programmed with very
limited information, usually its individual identification code. It is
often described as a write once/read many device, meaning that once
it has been programmed, the contents cannot be changed. It is
activated by magnetic induction and so derives the power needed to
broadcast a signal from coming close to a reader. Because a passive
tag does not have a power source, it cannot collect information about
its use; rather, tracking is left to the information received by the
reader. The range of a passive tag is quite limited.32
By comparison, an active tag has a power source, which allows it
both to transmit data further, and to process and store data internally.
Because of this, an active tag may be programmed to do more than
just report its unique identification code. In fact, an active tag's
capability is limited only by its location.33 If the tag is built into an
automobile, it could have a very complex operating system and large
storage capacity, running off of the car's battery. An active tag
attached to an article of clothing would generally have to be small so
as to be unobtrusive, and require a very sophisticated battery that is
both flexible and small.34
Whether passive or active, a tag is activated to transmit
information when it passes within range of a tag reader. Because the
broadcasting power of a tag is limited, given its size and the size of
the antenna, most readers only activate tags that come within 30 feet,
at most. The EZPass toll collection device is an example of a tag
consisting of a transponder that is activated when its possessor passes
through a tollbooth.
The RFID tag is divided into 3 primary parts: hardware, software
and data. The hardware in turn consists of two main components: the
chip and the antenna. For purposes of this article, the chip is the most
important hardware component, and although it may be comprised of
different components (in the same way as a computer is comprised of
a processor, random access memory, and hard drive storage), such
or 80 thousand trillion trillion objects - more than sufficient for man-made
physical products.
Id. (citations omitted).
31. RFID Journal, The Electronic Product Code, supra note 30.
32. Levary, supra note 24, at 2.
33. Id at 4.
34. NEC has developed just such a battery. NEC Develops Thin, Flexible Battery, PC
WORLD, Dec. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/O,aid, I 23875,00.asp.
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distinctions are not generally germane to the issue of ownership of the
data on the chip. This article will therefore refer to all of the hardware
associated with an RFID tag (other than the antenna) as the chip,
much as people discuss a computer as a single item.
EPCglobal has currently established six classes of tags: 35
EPC Tag Class Tag Class Capabilities
Class 0 Read only (i.e., the EPC number is encoded onto the
tag during manufacture and can be read by a reader).
Class 1 Read, write once (i.e., tags are manufactured without
the EPC number, which can be encoded onto the tag
later in the field).
Class 2 Read, write.
Class 3 Class 2 capabilities plus a power source to provide
increased range and/or advanced functionality.
Class 4 Class 3 capabilities plus active communication and the
ability to communicate with other active tags.
Class 5 Class 4 capabilities plus the ability to communicate
with passive tags, as well.
The current generation of tags being used by companies is the
Class 1 tag. 36 These tags are passive, and are only capable of being
35. HARDWARE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, APPENDIX B (EPCglobal, Inc. Aug. 27, 2004),
available at
http://www.epcglobalus.org/SubscriberResources/br>Ceritification%2 OPaper%/2OFinal %208.27.
04.pdf.
36. The capability of these tags is summarized by EPCglobal as follows:
Class-1: Identity Tags (normative)
Passive-backscatter Tags with the following minimum features:
* An electronic product code (EPC) identifier,
* A Tag identifier (TED),
* A 'kill' function that permanently disables the Tag,
* Optional password-protected access control, and
2006]
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written to once, which means that they have limited data storage
capabilities.
While such technology is not generally available today,
companies are developing an active tag that operates software and
stores data. 37 As the size of chips shrinks, and processing and data
storage capabilities rise, the ability to deploy sophisticated tags will
naturally attract some businesses. Even now, however, it is possible to
install quite sophisticated tags on automobiles, or many large
household appliances, such as refrigerators. Where size and power
source are not an issue, the technology currently exists to track the
movements and operations of the items to which the tags are attached.
For example, the Department of Transportation is actively pursuing
the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) initiative, which will put
transmitters on all cars to help avoid accidents. 38 The VII is being
designed to include the ability to store and transmit traffic
information: "Vehicles could serve as data collectors and
anonymously transmit traffic and road condition information from
every major road within the transportation network. ' '39
The data contained on the tag includes the EPC and any
additional information programmed into the tag by the merchant, or-
if it is a Class 2 tag or better-by the system installed on the chip.
The EPC is the critical part of this system, allowing for the
tracking of individual items. EPCglobal has developed a standard for
the EPC based on the work done by the Auto-ID labs at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The standard establishes a 96-
bit identification code, divided up into 4 primary parts: the Header,
EPC Manager Number, Object Class, and Serial Number. The Header
sets out what version of EPC is being used; the EPC Manager
Number is the unique identifier for the merchant responsible for the
tag; and the Object Class identifies the particular class of item being
identified. Up to this point, the EPC is similar to the UPC, in that it
only identifies the class of goods sold by a particular merchant.
However, by adding the Serial Number to the EPC, the EPC is now
Optional user memory.
37. Developer Offers Linux-based RFID, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.computerworld.com.au/pp.php?id=388926509 (tag can store up to 100 bytes of data,
but company working on increasing storage capacity).
38. Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII), U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
http://www.its.dot.gov/vii/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
39. Overview - ITS, U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
http://www.its.dot.gov/vii/viioverview.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). The DOT does state
that the transmission is intended to be anonymous.
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able to individually link the tag to the particular item to which it is
attached. As noted, the EPC is 96 bits long, designed to be able to
track every item ever produced by humankind.
The protocol established by EPCglobal for RFID tags in their
classification system also allows the tag to store and transmit
additional data. While the EPC is limited to 96 bits, the standard
established by EPCglobal allows for the user (i.e., the merchant of the
goods to which the tag is attached) to build additional memory into
the chip for storage of extra data beyond the EPC.
In order for such data tracking and storage to work, the chip
would have to do more than merely store the item's serial number.
Obviously, some form of computer code would also have to reside on
the chip, as well sufficient memory to store the data. To the extent
that the tag includes operating code in the form of software, it is
assumed that this code is copyrightable and owned by the
manufacturer. While this is likely, it is also possible that this code, or
at least part of it, is licensed to the manufacturer. This distinction does
not matter to the purchaser of the item, since no sale of the underlying
code would likely occur under copyright law with the sale of the item.
It is also possible that the code contains non-copyrightable elements,
or is subject to unique licensing agreements, such as the GPL.40 For
simplicity, it is nevertheless assumed that the manufacturer owns the
copyright to the code. This software is assumed to include whatever
code is necessary to operate the tag, to track information about the use
of the tag, and to handle other tracking or data collecting activities.
II. DIRECT OWNERSHIP OF DATA
A. Laws Governing Collected Information
In general, U.S. law provides limited protection for information
as such, particularly for personal information. 41 A number of scholars
40. The GNU General Public License allows users to freely distribute copies of software
licensed under its terms. GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE (Free Software Foundation, June
1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt ("The licenses for most software are designed to take
away your freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is
intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free software-to make sure the
software is free for all its users.").
41. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 222, 257-58
n.136-43 (2004), Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 403-04 (2003); See generally, Daniel J.
Solove & Marc Rotenberg, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (Aspen 2003); Paul M. Schwartz &
Joel R. Reidenberg, DATA PRIVACY LAW (Michie 1996).
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have argued that imposing a property regime in personal data would
solve many of the privacy concerns raised by commercial use of
data. 42 However, many other scholars disagree. 43
Nevertheless, under certain specific conditions, information may
be owned, or at least access to it controlled. This section explores the
extent to which the data itself is subject to protection under U.S. law.
1. Copyright
The Copyright Act only protects original works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression-specifically, the
original expression created by an author.44 Thus, in order for
copyright to attach to any information, it must embody a work of
authorship. 45
It is clear that writing information in an electronic form is a
fixation covered by copyright law.46 So long as the information can
be read through some means, it is fixed.47 Therefore, it is at least
possible that the data stored on a tag could comprise a work under the
Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act by its terms does not protect ideas, concepts,
or discoveries, among other things.48 In addition, the Supreme Court
42. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, And Personal Data, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2055, 2095 (2004) ("[P]ropertized personal information can be shaped to respond to
privacy market failure and the need for a privacy commons."); Developments in the Law-The
Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1634-49 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 41, at 383; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual
Property?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1143 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Private Property: A
Comment on Professor Samuelson's Contribution, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1545, 1551 (2000); Anita
L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 750-57 (1999).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
45. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ("To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original
to the author."); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation And Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection Of Works Of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873-83 (1990) (historical
development of the concept of "authorship" under copyright law).
46. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983) ("We held that the statutory requirement of "fixation", the manner in which the issue
arises, is satisfied through the embodiment of the expression in the ROM devices.").
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy.., is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."); see
also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (copying a
computer program into a computer's random access memory is a fixation under the Copyright
Act).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
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has held that the Copyright Act does not protect either individual
facts, 49 or informational works which present information in a fashion
that is typical, commonplace or inevitable (such as the alphabetical
white pages telephone directory at issue in the Feist case).50 However,
a compilation of data can be protected under the Copyright Act so
long as "the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship" due to the method of selecting, arranging, or coordinating
the data.51 Thus, in order for the data to be protected, the data must
comprise a factual work protected as a compilation under copyright
law.52
2. Copyright in Unique Identifier
The active tag that can track and store data contains two basic
forms of information: first, the EPC, the individualized electronic
product code; and second, the tracked data.
The first issue would be whether the manufacturer has rights in
the tag's identification number by itself. The first question is whether
the manufacturer is the "creator" of the number-in other words, how
is it that the EPC is assigned? That number is created in compliance
with the standards set forth by EPCglobal. 53 As described above, the
EPC is created using four pieces of information. The first two, the
Header and the Manager Number, are set according to the dictates of
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.").
49. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-48 ("'No one may claim originality as to facts.' This is because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship." (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court
determined that the exclusion of facts from copyright protection is constitutionally required by
the text of Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, which limits Congress's authority to
grant exclusive rights to authors to their writings. Id. at 346. Please see infra notes 74-80 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of the holding in Feist.
50. Id. at 362 ("In preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data provided by its
subscribers and lists it alphabetically by surname. The end product is a garden-variety white
pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.").
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "compilation"); Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51 ("A
factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of
facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement. In no event may
copyright extend to the facts themselves.").
52. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright And Other Protection of
Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338 (1992).
53. EPCTM Tag Data Standards Version 1.1 Rev.1.24, at 11 (Apr. 1, 2004). In fact, it is
EPCglobal that assigns a manager code. Id. ("EPCglobal assigns the General Manager Number
to an entity, and ensures that each General Manager Number is unique.").
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EPCglobal. 54 Thus, the manufacturer could make no claim to that
information.
The third and fourth parts, the Object Class and Serial Number,
are assigned by the manufacturer. 55 This part of the EPC could be
subject to a claim of copyright protection as an "original work of
authorship" by the manufacturer. The manufacturer would claim that
because the Object Class and Serial Number portions of the EPC
linked to a particular tag are unique and original, these portions of the
EPC form a work of authorship protected under U.S. copyright law.
However, recent case law suggests that a manufacturer would
not be able to claim any copyright ownership of the portion of the
EPC assigned by the manufacturer.
In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,56 Southco, a manufacturer
of rivets, fasteners, captive fasteners and other products, sued
Kanebridge for copyright infringement based on Kanebridge's use of
Southco part numbers in advertising. 57 Specifically, Kanebridge
included Southco part numbers in comparison charts in its advertising
and customer literature. 58 Southco claimed that its part numbers were
copyrightable, because the part numbers created by Southco were
unique and original, satisfying the low standard of originality under
Copyright law. 59 The District Court agreed, because Southco did not
assign random or arbitrary numbers, but rather used a system that
evidenced "creativity and effort."'60
The Third Circuit, in an en banc rehearing of a later appeal, held
that no such copyright could exist in Southco's parts numbers. 61 The
Third Circuit rejected Southco's arguments on two grounds. First, the
court held that the. numbers lacked sufficient originality to be
54. IMPLEMENTATION NOTES: HOW TO OBTAIN YOUR EPC MANAGER NUMBER
(EPCglobal, Inc. July 15, 2005),
http://www.epcglobalus.org/SubscriberResources/IN_4 EPCManagerNumber_072205.pdf. See
also, EPCTM Tag Data Standards Version 1.1 Rev.l .24, at 11 ("EPCglobal assigns the General
Manager Number to an entity, and ensures that each General Manager Number is unique.").
55. See IMPLEMENTATION NOTES, supra note 54, at 1.
56. 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 336 (2005).
57. Id. at 277-79.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-4337, 2000 WL 21257, at *4 (E.D.
Pa.Jan. 12, 2000), rev'd, 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001).
60. Id.
61. Southco Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2004). An earlier panel
had reversed the district court when it refused to issue an injunction because a different panel
had held that the part numbers were not copyrightable. This later opinion was vacated by the
later en banc decision of the Third Circuit. Southco Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 324 F.3d 190 (3d
Cir. 2003) (appeal after remand), vacated, 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
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protected.62 Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in Feist,63 the
Third Circuit stated that the part numbers lacked originality because
they were "rigidly dictated" 64 by the system developed by Southco for
assigning part numbers. 65 Although the assignment of a part number
was done by the part's designer, 66 the en banc panel held that in fact
the numbering was dictated by the decisions made in the system
developed by Southco. "Once these decisions were made, the system
was in place, and all of the products in the class could be numbered
without the slightest element of creativity."'67
The Third Circuit also held that the part names were not
copyrightable because they were similar to short phrases or titles of
works.68 The court based this analysis on the Copyright Office's
practice of denying copyright registration for phrases and titles, a
practice supported in a brief filed by the U.S. Government. 69
Although the court did not explore the question of whether this is an
absolute requirement under the Copyright Act or the U.S.
Constitution, many courts have deferred to the Copyright office's
determination of copyrightability. 70
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that individual
facts themselves cannot be copyrighted: "That there can be no valid
copyright in facts is universally understood."'71 Therefore, as a single
piece of information, it is not likely that the individual serial number
of the tag is copyrightable. Just because the manufacturer assigned
that number to the item, it is a fact that the item has that number. In
addition, there is no other way to refer to that individual tag without
62. Southco, 390 F.3d at 281.
63. Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
64. 390 F.3d at 282.
65. Id. at 281-85.
66. 324 F.3d at 193-94
These numbers were not dictated by any numbering system. Not only each
number as a whole, but each group of digits and each digit in each number was
created by me based upon the specific products which I had created and my
determination of the values of those products to be represented and the digits to
be used. The part number for each new part was created on the basis of my
decisions.
Id. (quoting declaration of Robert H. Bisbing, designer of fasteners for Southco).
67. 390 F.3d at 282.
68. Id. at 285-87.
69. Id. at 286. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2005) (Copyright Office's regulation prohibiting
copyright registration for words and short phrases).
70. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §7.26 (2005).
71. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340, 344.
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relying on its unique serial number. As a result, it is highly unlikely
that the EPC can be owned by anyone under copyright law.
3. Copyright in Compiled Data
i. Mere Facts/Data - the Feist Problem
Depending on the capabilities of the tag, the data stored on the
tag likely consists of more than a single piece of information. If the
tag is an active tag with its own power source and non-volatile
memory, it has the capability to store information in addition to the
EPC. Such an active tag may track a series or stream of data written
to the tag's memory over time, such as times, locations, accesses, or
technical data about the item to which the tag is attached, such as oil
pressure in a car. The resulting tracked information will consist of a
database or compilation of the information tracked.
As discussed in the preceding section, it is clear that the
individual facts contained on the chip will not be protected under
copyright law. However, it may be that the data are protectable as a
copyrightable compilation. 72 The Copyright Act specifically provides
that a compilation "is a work formed by the collection and assembling
of... data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship." 73
The Supreme Court has addressed when a compilation consisting
of factual information is protected under this provision. In Feist, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether the creation of a white pages
telephone directory was protectable as a copyrighted work. Rural
Telephone had compiled white pages phone books, listing
alphabetically the names and phone numbers of residents of
Northwest Kansas. 74 Feist, a competitor of Rural, copied entire
sections of the phone book without permission, 75 creating its own
directory. 76 Rural claimed that Feist had infringed its copyright in its
72. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 3.6 (2005); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, And Sui Generis Protection Of Databases In The United
States AndAbroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
74. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
75. Feist had tried to license the white pages from Rural, but Rural refused. Id. at 343.
76. Id. By wholesale copying of Rural's directory, Feist inadvertently included four
listings that were fictitious, inserted by Rural to detect copying.
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telephone directory, which it claimed was a copyrightable
compilation. 77
The Court held that while the Copyright Act never protects facts,
it is possible to obtain a copyright in a factual work, such as an
original compilation of facts. So long as the compilation of facts is
independently created by the author and contains some degree of
creativity, then it is a copyrighted work.78
Nevertheless, the Court held that some original expression in the
selection and arrangement of the information must exist for copyright
to attach. As stated by the Court:
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in
what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so
that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to
selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently
by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations
through the copyright laws. 79
Ultimately, the Feist Court held that the arrangement of the
names of telephone subscribers in alphabetical order can never be
protected by copyright, because the arrangement is obvious, even
necessary. 80
Thus, for the compilation of data stored on the tag to be
copyrightable, the manufacturer would have to show that the database
created based on the tracking reflects original selection, coordination
or arrangement of the data by the author. The level of creativity
needed is low, as explained by the Supreme Court in Feist. For
example, mundane compilations, such as a listing of the best
restaurants in a city, have been held to demonstrate enough creativity
to be protected as original works of authorship. 81 Even a blank form
used to display particular information from publicly available
statistics about sporting events could be sufficiently creative to be
protected, if the choice of statistics presented is original to the creator
77. Id. at 347.
78. Id. at 348.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 363 ("[T]here is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically
in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so
commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course.").
81. Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942).
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of the form. 82 Thus, very little original expression is necessary to
make a compilation copyrightable. 83
Several courts have had to distinguish between copyrightable
and uncopyrightable compilations based on the nature of the selection
process of the facts comprising a compilation. The Seventh Circuit
held in Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk that the selection of data
presented in a title insurance commitment was not original. 84 In the
Kirk case, the court found that the decision to include facts in the title
commitment was not based upon the individual judgment of the title
examiner, but "instead it was a matter of convention and strict
industry standards. '85 Because the selection process was "too rote and
mechanical," the compilation was not copyrightable. 86
By comparison, the process of selection of what businesses to
include in a yellow pages directory compiled for the Chinese-
American community in New York was copyrightable. 87 As stated by
the Second Circuit, "[s]election implies the exercise of judgment in
choosing which facts from a given body of data to include in a
compilation. ' 88 Because the authors of the directory had to choose
among many possible businesses to include in a yellow pages
directory compiled for a particular audience, the author of the
directory had created an original compilation of otherwise
uncopyrightable facts. 89
Thus, in order for the data on the tag to be a protected
compilation, the data would have to be selected in an original fashion.
If the tag is tracking all relevant information about a certain sensor
data, such as the oil pressure in an engine at set intervals, this likely
does not reflect any original selection of the data. Where the
82. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Bucklew v.
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2003).
83. See, e.g., CCC Info. Serv., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1994) (Red Book valuations of used cars copyrightable); CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256
(9th Cir. 1999) (numerical price estimates of coins was copyrightable).
84. Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 722.
86. Id. See also Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 206-
08 (2nd Cir. 1986) (recording five basic facts about municipal bond redemptions on to index
cards evidenced no original selection and arrangement).
87. Key Publ'ns. v. Chinatown Today Publ'ng. Ent., 945 F.2d 509, 513-14 (2nd Cir.
1991).
88. Id. at 513.
89. Id.
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compilation seeks to be comprehensive, 90 or uses a standard set of
selection criteria, then the compilation is not copyrightable. 91 In a
similar fashion, the Second Circuit denied copyright protection for
West Publishing's pagination system. 92 Noting that the page breaks
were inserted into court opinions by a computer program, the court
held that resulting page numbers were not protected by copyright law
because "the internal pagination of West's case reporters does not
entail even a modicum of creativity."93 Thus, if the tag is tracking
everywhere the item has been, or all statistical information about the
item's use or operation, then likely the compilation will not be held to
be copyrightable.
Perhaps an argument can be made that the selection of what data
to track specified in the tag's programming requires some creativity
by the author.94 For example, in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom
Technology, Inc. a competing hard drive vendor was held liable when
it sold hard drives that included data on the hard drive's firmware
copied from Compaq Computer's hardware.95 Compaq had designed
a program called the Compaq Insight Manager (CIM) that determined
when failure of a hard drive was imminent based upon a limited set of
threshold values from a large number of possible parameters. 96
Procom, the competitor, copied those values onto its hard drives in
order to make them compatible with the CIM used in Compaq's
ProLiant line of servers. 97 The court ruled that Compaq had exercised
discretion in choosing the number of parameters and which particular
parameters to monitor. In addition, because the thresholds picked
were based upon both estimates of when the drives would fail and the
cost of replacing those drives under warranty, those threshold values
were not facts.98
90. Warren Publ'ng., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518 (11 th Cir. 1997)
(factbook containing lists of cable systems not copyrightable because it included entire relevant
universe of such cable companies).
91. See Financial Info., 808 F.2d at 206-08 (recording five basic facts about municipal
bond redemptions on index cards evidenced no original selection and arrangement); NIMMER,
supra note 70, § 3.7.
92. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'ng. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699-700 (2d Cir.
1998).
93. Id. at 699.
94. See infra notes 109-130 for a discussion of who the author of the database is.
95. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
96. Id. at 1414-15.
97. Id. at 1415-17.
98. Id. at 1417-18.
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In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether the extraction of data compiled by a copyrighted program
imposing a unique system for arranging otherwise uncopyrightable
data constituted infringement. Assessment Technologies (AT)
licensed a program called "Market Drive" to local municipalities to
aid them in compiling data about property in the community for
assessing property taxes.99 The data were entered into the program by
tax assessors, and the program allocated the data into 456 fields and
34 master categories. 100 WIREdata asked several municipalities for
the data contained in the databases, and AT sued to prevent
WIREdata from obtaining the information, claiming that AT owned
the copyright in the resulting databases created by the Market Drive
program. 10 1 The Seventh Circuit ruled first that AT did have a valid
copyright in its program, because "no other real estate assessment
program arranges the data collected by the assessor in these 456 fields
grouped into these 34 categories, and because this structure is not so
obvious or inevitable as to lack the minimal originality
required . ,,102 If WIREdata had copied the data in the structure
setup in Market Drive, WIREdata would have infringed AT's
copyright. 103
However, WIREdata only wanted access to the underlying raw
data contained in the databases, not the data as formatted by the
Market Drive program. The issue then was whether the data could be
extracted from the database without violating the Market Drive
program. 104 The court held that because WIREdata sought only the
raw data, and the data was in the public domain, copying that data
was legal so long as they did not use the Market Drive system to copy
the data.105 The court noted that AT did not create the databases that
it was seeking to protect-the tax assessors were the ones to actually
enter the data. Instead, all that AT had created was the empty bin that
the data went into:
It created the compartments in the bin and the instructions for
sorting the data to those compartments, but those were its only
innovations and their protection by copyright law is complete. To
try by contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from
99. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 642-43.
101. Id. at 642.
102. Id. at 643.
103. Id. (citing Key Publ'ns., 945 F.2d at 513-14).
104. Id. at 643-44.
105. Id.
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revealing their own data, especially when, as we have seen, the
complete data are unavailable anywhere else, might constitute
copyright misuse. 106
In fact, the Seventh Circuit held that it would not infringe AT's
copyright when the municipalities use the Market Drive program to
extract the data, save it in a separate file and then give that file to
WIREdata. 10 7
In much the same way, the manufacturers of the tag create empty
bins into which the tracked data is sorted and stored. While the
program for doing so may be copyrightable (it is assumed to be so for
this article), the resulting data is not selected by the manufacturer.
Thus, where the selection is done according to a pre-programmed
system, the resulting compilation should not be protected by
copyright.
In addition, the data contained in the tag is not compiled
according to a fixed selection and arrangement. That is, the software
on the chip merely tracks and stores data according to a set of criteria,
identifying each particular datum as it is received according to those
criteria. It is not until the data are later viewed that the selection and
arrangement is really imposed. Thus it is the software used by the
reader to organize the data that imposes the arrangement on the data.
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that no arrangement of the
data is made until it is viewed by the person wishing to analyze the
data.10 8 Of course, the selection of the data to be tracked is based
upon the decision of the author of the software, and that software
itself may reflect some creativity.
Even if the compilation were copyrighted, a single fact taken
from that compilation is not subject to copyright protection, and
106. Id. at 646-47.
107. Id. at 644.
To summarize, there are at least four possible methods by which WIRE data can
obtain the data it is seeking without infringing AT's copyright; which one is
selected is for the municipality to decide in light of applicable trade-secret, open-
records, and contract laws. The methods are: (1) the municipalities use Market
Drive to extract the data and place it in an electronic file; (2) they use Microsoft
Access to create an electronic file of the data; (3) they allow programmers
furnished by WIREdata to use their computers to extract the data from their
database-this is really just an alternative to W1REdata's paying the
municipalities' cost of extraction, which the open-records law requires; (4) they
copy the database file and give it to WIREdata to extract the data from.
Id. at 647-48.
108. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'ng. Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ'ng., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th
Cir. 1993).
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another person may use it for his or her benefit. Thus, even if the data
on the chip is copyrightable as a compilation, accessing the chip and
obtaining a single piece of information is not likely to be deemed
copyright infringement. So, for example, if an independent
automobile dealer downloads the oil pressure of a car at a particular
instant, this is not likely to be an infringement of the compilation of
data regarding oil pressure over time.
ii. Authorship
Another concern with the data is that it is generated by the
software contained on the chip without direct human input. Although
there clearly is an author of the software, the resulting data
compilation is generated automatically based upon pre-selected
criteria, and not on the basis of creative judgment of a human author.
Thus, a question arises as to whether there is any author of the data at
all.
One possibility is that the data is "authored" by the programs
contained on the chip. The Copyright Act does not specifically
require that a work be authored by a human in order to receive
copyright protection. 109 However, the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution does mention "author," 110 and the Supreme
court has stated that "[a]s a general rule, the author is the party who
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection." 1 1
This is consistent with the Court's holdings in two separate cases
decided over a century earlier. In the first case, the Trade-Mark
Cases, the Court described a protectable writing as an original work
of the mind. 112 Five years later, in holding that a photograph of Oscar
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("[C]opyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,... from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."). See also Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that
even thought the Copyright Act does not specifically require human authorship, nevertheless the
law was not intended to protect a work claimed to be authored by celestial beings).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
Ill. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
112. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("And while the word writings may
be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is
only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books,
prints, engravings and the like.").
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Wilde was copyrightable, the Court stated that copyright is "the
exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or
intellect."1 3 David Nimmer has noted that "rivers of ink" have been
spilt in the secondary literature on whether a computer can be an
author for purposes of copyright law. 114 While some commentators
have argued that a computer could, theoretically, be an author, at least
with respect to works created through use of artificial intelligence,"l 5
most reject the idea. 116 The same result was reached by the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
when it issued its Final Report in 1979.117
In fact, the human involvement in creating the "compilation" in
the tag ends with the authoring of the software. The data have not yet
come into existence when the human element ends. At the time that
the data are subject to tracking on the chip, no human has viewed the
data, let alone made any creative decisions about whether to include
113. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). But see Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, And Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1062 (1993) ("There are
limits to literal reading. By making references to 'he' and 'man,' the Court was no more
excluding machines from eligibility for authorship than it was excluding women. There simply
is less than meets the eye in the language of the opinion.").
114. NIMMER, supra note 70, § 5.01.
115. See, e.g., Karl F. Milde, Jr., Can a Computer Be an "Author" or an "Inventor"?, 51 J.
PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 378 (1969).
116. See, e.g., William T. Ralston, Copyright In Computer-Composed Music: Hal Meets
Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 281, 302-03 (2005) (Rejecting the computer as author,
and favoring the user as author); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property In The Era Of The
Creative Computer Program: Will The True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TuL. L. REv. 1675,
1682-86 (1997) ("Author" is a term of art under the Copyright Act, meaning the actual
individual that created the work); David Nimmer, Brains And Other Paraphernalia Of The
DigitalAge, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996); Miller, supra note 113, at 1056-73 ("[Ihf the day
arrives when a computer really is the sole author of an original artistic, musical, or literary work
(whether a novel or a computer program), copyright law will be embracive and malleable
enough to assimilate that development into the world of protected works."); Pamela Samuelson,
Allocating Ownership Rights In Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 1185, 1192-
1200 (1986) ("Only those stuck in the doctrinal mud could even think that computers could be
'authors.').
117. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT, at 44 (1979) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT) ("On the basis of its investigations
and society's experience with the computer, the Commission believes that there is no reasonable
basis for considering that a computer in any way contributes authorship to a work produced
through its use."). As stated in the report, "The National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) was created by Congress as part of the effort to revise
comprehensively the copyright laws of the United States." Id. at 1. It's particular focus was on
"changes in copyright law or procedure needed both to assure public access to copyrighted
works used in conjunction with computer and machine duplication systems and to respect the
rights of owners of copyrights in such works, while considering the concerns of the general
public and the consumer." Id.
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any of the data, or how to arrange them. Human interaction does not
come into play again until the data compilation is accessed by a
reader and acted upon by the person interpreting the data. One
possible argument, then, is that there is no author at all, and the data is
completely uncopyrightable.11 8 However, most commentators do not
believe that this is likely to be held to be the case.1 19
Another argument is that the author who created the code
establishing the criteria for tracking the data is the author of the
resulting compilation created using that criterion. 120 This would make
the manufacturer the author of the resulting database contained on the
tag. The problem with this argument is that while there is an author of
the "structure" of the compilation, the compilation only comes into
existence by imposing this structure on the data, without regard to the
selection or arrangement of the particular data contained in the
database. However, since the author of the code did not cause the data
to be recorded (fixed, in the language of copyright), at best it can be
argued that the manufacturer created the circumstances under which
the data was recorded. 121
118. See Samuelson, supra note 116, at 1224-28 (noting that it is not necessary to grant a
human being rights to encourage the creation of computer generated works).
119. For example, Professor Samuelson concludes that the "no author" result is not likely
to be adopted, although a "seemingly sensible proposal" because "it conflicts with the temper of
the times." Id. at 1225. Accord Miller, supra note 113, at 1058-59 ("Although commentators
have differed as to who should be considered the author of a computer-generated work, they
seem to agree that it should be a human being or legal entity, even though identifying that author
may not always be easy .. ") (citing Samuelson, supra note 116, at 1224-28). One recent
article argues that the 1997 Ninth Circuit opinion in Urantia Found. v. Maaherra 114 F.3d 955
(9th Cir. 1997), which held that a work written based on answers from celestial beings was
authored by the persons that created the written work, would support this result. Id. at 959. See
Christina Rhee, Note, Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 76 (1998)
("If courts strictly apply the Urantia decision to future copyright claims over computer-
generated works, they will grant the copyright to a human, most likely the computer program
user.").
120. See Samuelson, supra note 116, at 1205-21 (concluding that the programmer is not the
author of a computer-generated work, whether directly or as a derivative work).
121. Accord Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 60-61. The Court cited with
approval an earlier English case, Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. Div. 627, which decided on the
issue of authorship of a photograph. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[tihe question in
the case was whether the plaintiffs, who owned the establishment in London, where the
photographs were made from the negative, and were sold, and who had the negative taken by
one of their men, were the authors, or the man who, for their benefit, took the negative." The
English court held that the person that "took the negative" was the author. Id.
The nearest I can come to is that it is the person who effectively is as near as he
can be the cause of the picture which is produced; that is, the person who has
superintended the arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting
the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the
man who is the effective cause of that.
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So, for example, where the pagination in West's reporters was
generated automatically by the software, the court held that no
copyright existed because it did not entail even a modicum of
originality. 122 Similarly, as the Court in Assessment Technologies
held, the manufacturer had only created an empty database, a bin that
could be filled with data. 123 By comparison, the creator of the Red
Book of automobile values takes the raw data and uses creativity in
choosing values from that data to represent the values of automobiles
throughout the United States. There is a human author that acts upon
the data to create a copyrightable database. The values are arrived at
using skill and judgment, which means that the information consists
of the original expression of the Redbook valuations. 124
Even if there is a human author of the data, that author is at least
in part the consumer that purchased the item and began using it.125 It
is the interaction of the software with the consumer's actions that
generates the data, not the author of the software itself. Much like a
person who uses Microsoft Word to create a literary work, it is the
person using the software that is the author, not Microsoft. 126 This
result is consistent with the CONTU Report. 127
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 61 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson).
122. Matthew Bender & Co., v. West Publ'ng. Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
123. Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 646. But see Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt.
Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that Madison River
Management violated Business Management Software's (BMS) copyright in a database created
by BMS's ProvideC software, where Madison River had copied the entire database). This case
seems to misapply the rule set out in Assessment Techs., which held that the Business
Management Software Corp.'s "database is covered by [BMS's] copyright over its [] software."
Id. at 534-35. The Madison River court states that the Seventh Circuit had determined that the
database was held to be copyrightable, when in fact what the Seventh Circuit found was that the
plaintiff's Market Drive program was copyrightable. See Assessment Technologies, 350 F.3d at
643. Nevertheless, the Madison River court based its holding on the fact that Madison River had
copied the entire database, including its structure, not for the purposes of extracting the raw data
as in Assessment Technologies, but to use that structure to run reports from the entire database.
Madison River, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (citing Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 643).
124. CCC Info. Serv. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
125. See CONTU Report, supra note 117, at 45. ("Finally, we confront the question of who
is the author of a work produced through the use of a computer. The obvious answer is that the
author is one who employs the computer").
126. See Samuelson, supra note 115, at 1200 n.71.
127. CONTU REPORT, supra note 117, at 45:
To be used in the creation of a work, a computer must be controlled by a program
and must ordinarily utilize data input from other sources. Both the program and
the data may be copyrighted works or parts of copyrighted works. The question
has been raised whether authorship or proprietorship of the program or data base
establishes or may establish a claim of authorship of the final work. It appears to
the Commission that authorship of the program or of the input data is entirely
720 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
In limited circumstances a work may be a work made for hire,
which changes the nature of authorship. If a work is made for hire,
then the author is not the person actually creating the work, but the
company or individual that hired them to create the work. 128 All
works created by employees in the scope of their employment are
works for hire, 129 as are a certain group of limited types of specially
ordered or commissioned works, such as movies and compilations,
where the author has executed a written agreement acknowledging
that the work is made for hire. 130
Since the consumer is not likely to be an employee of the person
creating the data compilation, this type of authorship under the work
for hire doctrine would not apply. In addition, the consumer is also
not likely to be an independent contractor hired to assist in the
creation of the work. Even if the resulting database is held to be a
work for hire compilation, an independent contractor must agree in a
signed writing that the work is a work for hire. Unless the consumer
purchased the item using some form of signed writing, such as a
charge slip, and that charge slip specifically included work for hire
language, the resulting data is not likely to be deemed a work for hire.
4. Database Protection
Given the holding in Feist, databases that consist of
electronically generated compilations of facts are not likely to be
protected under U.S. copyright law unless some original selection and
arrangement is applied to the database.131 Further, there exists no sui
generis protection for databases under current U.S. law. Although
attempts have been made to pass database protection legislation in the
U.S., at the moment no such protection exists. 132
separate from authorship of the final work, just as authorship of a translation of a
book is distinct from authorship of the original work.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); NIMMER, supra note 70, § 5.03.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 739-41
(status as employee should be analyzed under the general common law of agency).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Specifically, such works include:
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as
a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.
131. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, And Sui Generis Protection Of
Databases In The United States And Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 153 (1997).
132. Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 645; Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 171.
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Although not directly relevant to the discussion of whether the
data contained on a tag is protected under U.S. law, the European
Commission's directive regarding ownership of databases, the EU
Database Directive, 133 may be adopted in some form in the United
States. This Directive prevents extraction or reutilization of data from
a database, even if the data are not subject to copyright protection. 134
The EU has thus created a right against misappropriation of data
under certain proscribed circumstances. In order to receive this
protection, there must have been a substantial investment in the
database, and the infringer must either copy all or substantially all of
the database, or, if the infringer has only taken an insubstantial part,
have done so on a regular basis. 135
As a result, under the sui generis protection for databases
conferred by the Database Directive, a different analysis from
copyright law is required to find liability. The first consideration is
whether the owner of the item is the creator of the database or the
manufacturer and distributor of the chip. The Directive states that the
sui generis rights apply to the "maker" of the database. 136 However,
no definition of maker is included in the Directive.
If the owner of the item is the chip manufacturer and distributor
rather than the database creator, there is an interesting question as to
whether it has made a substantial investment in the database (as
opposed to the chip and its software). Although clearly great effort
may have gone into designing the chip and writing the software, the
133. Directive on Legal Protection of Databases (Database Directive), 96/9/EC, O.J. 77
(Mar. 27, 1996). See generally, W. R. Cornish, European Community Directive On Database
Protection, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1996).
134. Database Directive, supra note 133, at Chapter III, arts. 7-11 (Sui Generis Protection
provisions). Specifically, the Directive states that
Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows
that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent
extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated
qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.
Id. at art. 7(1).
Chapter II of the Database Directive also contains provisions regarding copyright protection for
databases, which extends copyright protection to "databases which, by reason of the selection or
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected
as such by copyright." Id. at art. 3(1). However, the copyright in such databases "shall not
extend to their contents and shall be without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents
themselves." Id. at art. 3(2).
135. Id. at art. 7(1).
136. Id. at art. 7(1). For copyright protection, the author is "the natural person or group of
natural persons who created the base or, where the legislation of the Member States so permits,
the legal person designated as the rightholder by that legislation." Id. art. 4(1).
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manufacturer and distributor have not made any independent effort to
create the database contained on the RFID tag. That effort clearly was
made by the owner of the item.
If it is the owner of the item that creates the database, then
presumably the rights to the database would accrue to the owner him
or herself, if anyone at all. If the database is created merely by
tracking the use of the item that the tag is attached to, it may be that
this will be deemed to be insubstantial, at least to the extent that it is
unintentional. Even if this effort is deemed substantial, the owner of
the chip would nevertheless be the proper party to assert rights in the
database, not the manufacturer. Unless the EU courts are willing to
extend to the manufacturer the right to assert the interest of the item's
owner, it is not likely that anyone capturing data from an RFID tag
would be liable to a manufacturer under the Directive.
A separate question would be how much of the database is taken
when the chip broadcasts its contents upon being turned on. If the
chip "voluntarily" gives up its contents to the reader, presumably this
would not be an unauthorized extraction. Even so, it might be an
unauthorized reutilization. If only the latest data is used, such as the
current oil pressure in a car, the test would be whether it was a
repeated and systematic reutilization. It may be that the data taken
from a particular item is only used once. If so, it is not likely that this
would be seen as a systematic use of the data. However, perhaps
where the reader is taking data from numerous separate databases,
this could be seen to be systematic and repeated. Such an
interpretation would likely be at odds with the language of the
Directive, though, which speaks in terms of single databases, and not
reutilization of limited data across numerous databases. 137
5. Trade Secret
In the United States, trade secrets are protected under state law.
Although there is no single method of protecting trade secrets, most
states in the U.S. have adopted some version of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA). 138  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
137. Id art 7(2)(a)-(b) ("extraction" and "reutilization" are defined as transferring or
making available to the public, respectively, "all or a substantial part of the contents of a
database") (emphasis added).
138. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (1990). Forty five states and the
District of Columbia have passed some version of the UTSA. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1,
14 U.L.A. 433-67 Refs. and Annos. (1990). There are several federal laws that criminalize theft
of trade secrets, as well. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail fraud); Economic
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000); National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314
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Competition also contains a definition of trade secrets. 139 Even
though there is some variation in the language of various definitions
for trade secrets, 140 they are nevertheless generally seen as
consistent. 141 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets
forth the most succinct definition: "A trade secret is any information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others." 142
As this definition makes clear, virtually any information can be a
trade secret, provided that it gives a competitive advantage to its
(2000). An older common law formulation from the first Restatement of Torts, section 757 of
the original Restatement of Torts, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939), is still commonly
relied upon by courts. See MILGRIM, § I.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). The Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition is intended to be the modem restatement of the common law
protection of trade secret law. Id. § 39 reporters' note (also noting the applicability of the
Restatement to UTSA cases).
140. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines trade secrets: "A trade secret
is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
The definition of a trade secret is also contained in the comments to section 757 of the
first Restatement of Torts: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
757 cmt. b (1939).
141. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2][a] (2005). One
difference between the definition of trade secrets contained in the UTSA and the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, on the one hand, and the Restatement of Torts section 757, on
the other, is that section 757 states that information of short duration should not be protected as
a trade secret, where the UTSA and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition contain no such
restriction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A.
(1990).
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995). The drafters of
the Restatement intended this to be consistent with the definition of trade secrets under the
UTSA. Id. cmt. b.
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owner and the owner keeps it a secret. 143 The information is only
protected if it is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its
secrecy. 144 However, the owner is not required to go to extraordinary
lengths to maintain secrecy; all that is needed is that he or she takes
reasonable steps to ensure that the information does not become
generally known. 145 Care must be taken to limit access to the
information, 146 and such information should only be disclosed in
confidence.
A limited disclosure may not cause the information
automatically to lose its trade secret status, so long as it is still
possible to keep the information secret in the future. 147 One important
issue will be whether the trade secret owner is owed a duty of
confidentiality by those who receive the information. Such duties can
be implied in law, such as between an employer and employee, or
based upon an express agreement to keep the information
confidential, such as with a non-disclosure agreement between those
that receive the information. The lack of such an obligation will likely
cause the owner to lose the trade secret status of the information.
i. What Information May Be Protected?
What is interesting about the definition of trade secrets, whether
under the UTSA or the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, is
that it consistently states that "any information" can function as a
trade secret. Under that definition, it would appear that even the
information contained on the chip owned by the consumer would be
included. So long as this information is subject to reasonable efforts
to maintain its secrecy, then the manufacturer should be able to make
a reasoned argument that the data contained on the chip is its trade
secret. This would be true even with the unique identifier, so long as
it cannot be retrieved through normal means-that is, if it is only
143. MILGRIM, supra note 141, § 1.05.
144. The term "secret" is used in the definition of trade secret in all three formulations.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. (1990).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995) ("Information
known by persons in addition to the trade secret owner can retain its status as a trade secret if it
remains secret from others to whom it has potential economic value."); MILGRIM, supra note
141, § 1.05.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g. See also id. § 39
reporters' note cmt. f. ("the precautions required of the trade secret owner may increase with
increasing dissemination").
147. Id. § 39 cmt. f.
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transmitted to a "trusted" reader. The same analysis would hold true
with the data.
The interesting part of this analysis is whether the person
claiming trade secret status in the information can make this claim
when the hardware containing the information-the chip on the tag-
is likely owned by the consumer. Assuming that the consumer has not
expressly agreed to keep the data confidential and not to share it with
anyone else, would a court nevertheless protect the data as a secret
under these circumstances?
A distinction should be made between the right of the consumer
to access the data (or more likely, to permit a third party to access the
data), and a third party accessing the data without the consumer's
knowledge. In the case of consumers accessing the data, it would
seem unlikely that a court would hold them liable for
misappropriation of data contained on a chip that they themselves
owned, at least without an express agreement to keep the data secret.
ii. Duty of Confidence
Information is protected under trade secret law where there is a
duty to keep that information secret. That obligation is created either
by implication, 148 as through the duty of loyalty imposed on
employees, 149 or expressly by contract. 150 Based on the assumptions
in this article, the consumer will not have expressly entered into any
such agreement with the purchase of the item. It is possible, however,
that a consumer may have expressly agreed to provisions in a contract
to keep the data secret, such as the purchase agreement signed when a
consumer buys a car, or a click wrap agreement entered into when the
consumer installs software. In fact, most agreements relating to the
sale of goods are contained in the manuals and warranty documents
that a consumer receives along with the product. For purposes of this
article, though, it is assumed that no specific agreement relating to
confidentiality is included in these agreements.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(b) (1995); MILGRIM, supra
note 141, § 1.05, §3.01.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (1995); MILGRIM, supra note
141, § 5.02[1] ("The relationship between an employer and an employee is a confidential one.
The existence of such relationship between employer and employee imposes a duty upon the
employee not to use or disclose the employer's confidential information to the employer's
detriment.").
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(a); MILGRIM, supra note 141,
§4.01.
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Where no express agreement to keep the data secret exists, it is
unlikely that a duty of confidentiality would be implied in the
consumer/retailer relationship. Unlike the employer/employee
relationship, which has traditionally been recognized to include an
implied duty of confidentiality, 15 1 no such duty exists between a
consumer and the seller. 152 Certainly, no such implied duty would be
understood to exist between a consumer and the manufacturer. There
is no expectation that the consumer will keep any information relating
to the manufacturer private. In fact, the exact opposite expectation
exists-that once the manufacturer's products have been sold, any
information contained in the purchased product, or that can be reverse
engineered from it, is in the public domain. 153 Even if the product is
covered by patents or copyrights, the information is not secret, but
just limited in its use by the strictures of patent and copyright law.
Therefore, it is not likely that a court would hold that merely by
purchasing an item containing a tag, the consumer impliedly agrees to
keep any and all information contained on that tag a secret. Further,
since the consumer owns the tag, he or she should have a right to take
the tag apart, inspect it, and even use whatever means are at his or her
disposal to get access to the data contained on the tag.
By way of analogy, it is hard to imagine that a court would hold
a computer owner liable for accessing a browser cookie 54 stored on
his or her computer by a company when the computer owner accessed
the company's web site. Even assuming that the company had taken
reasonable steps to keep the cookie secret, such as by making it a
hidden file or encrypting it, it still was located on someone else's
computer.
iii. Reasonable Efforts to Keep RFID Data Secret
The amount of information contained on the tag is not directly
relevant to whether the information is a trade secret. Thus, the EPC
itself, and the compiled data on the chip, could be protected as a trade
151. MILGRIM, supra note 141, § 3.02.
152. MILORIM, supra note 141, § 1.05 ("Thus, it is an almost undisputed proposition that
when an article, the "secret" nature of which is fathomable upon scrutiny and inspection, is
marketed, the "secret" is lost").
153. See, e.g., Darling v. Standard Alaska Prod. Co., 818 P.2d 677, 681-82 (Alaska 1991)
(no trade secret protection where product publicly sold and displayed to parties that copied
product); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289-90 (2d Dist. 1962)
("'Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be his
secret'(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 757, cmt. b)).
154. See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy In Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, 1227-29 (1998) (discussing the function of cookies).
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secret, assuming all of the other requirements for trade secret status
were met.
First, the manufacturer must use reasonable efforts to maintain
the secrecy of the data contained on the tag.155 What would be
deemed reasonable? Limiting access to the data certainly is a
necessary precondition to the existence of a trade secret in the data
contained on the tag. 156 The average consumer would not have easy
access to the information contained on the chip. Such limited access,
by itself, is not likely to constitute reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy, however, if the data is easily accessible by someone with
knowledge of how to access the data. 157 For example, if the tag is
designed to transmit its data to any reader that requests the
information, the information would be readily ascertainable and thus
not subject to a reasonable effort to maintain its secrecy.
Additionally, the information must not be disseminated widely,
and when disseminated, should be done in a manner calculated to
keep it secret. 158 While the chips themselves will be widely
disseminated, it is unlikely that the data contained on any particular
chip would be provided to a wide audience. By its nature, the tag only
tracks the particular item to which it is attached, and only provides
that information when a reader instructs it to transmit the data.
However, if the chip transmits its data whenever it is requested to do
so, this certainly would seem to go beyond the limitations imposed
under trade secret law to protect such information.
What a court would likely require is that the tag not be accessible
by unauthorized readers, at a minimum. This means that the tag
should only communicate with approved readers. Further, the data
contained in the tag should be protected by some sort of technology
limiting access, such as encryption of the data.
There is a more fundamental question: does trade secret law as
currently developed even reach information of the nature contained in
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f. (1995) ("[T]he
requirement of secrecy is satisfied if it would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit
the information to acquire it without resort to the wrongful conduct proscribed under § 40.");
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 538 (1990).
156. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 539, cmt. (1990) ("[R]easonable efforts to
maintain secrecy have been held to include advising employees of the existence of a trade
secret, limiting access to a trade secret on "need to know basis", and controlling plant access.").
157. See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 916-20 (Ind. 1993)
(holding that the location of potential oilfields was a trade secret even though information about
such location was in the public domain, because it was not readily ascertainable, instead
requiring a substantial investment of time, expense, or effort to discover the information).
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f(1995).
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an RFID tag? Cases analyzing trade secrets are dealing with
information created, or at least acquired, by the party claiming trade
secret status for the information.159 So, for example, a customer list,
or secret formula, protected as a trade secret is usually generated by
its owner. Thus, in the usual case the records are created by the owner
or his or her employees or agents and kept in the owner's records or
on the owner's computer systems.
With an RFID tag, by contrast, it is the consumer that both
creates the record and maintains it, arguably on the consumer's own
property (the RFID tag). The item owner can convincingly argue that
it is his or her own secret information, and not that of the
manufacturer, unlike a customer list. The record is not generated or
maintained by the manufacturer, but by the consumer. Even if the
manufacturer were only required to prove possession of the trade
secret, 160 it would be difficult to show possession of information
contained on a tag owned by the consumer, containing information
unknown to the manufacturer. In fact, unless otherwise agreed, the
item owner can even prevent the manufacturer from ever accessing
the tag and associated database,161 and can destroy the database
without any liability.
If the item owner is the creator of the trade secret, and thus its
owner, then it is up to the item owner to determine the proper use of,
and access to, the database on the tag. Under trade secret law, at least,
the item owner would have the right to permit third parties to have
access to the data at their discretion. Further, it would be the item
owner, in the first instance, that would have the right to assert a claim
for misappropriation, given that it is their trade secret that is being
taken. The manufacturer would likely not even have standing to
sue. 162
This does not mean that the manufacturer is without an
argument. Certainly, the parties could have negotiated a contract
159. DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001) ("As a
consequence, one "owns" a trade secret when one knows of it, as long as it remains a secret.");
MILGRIM, supra note 141, § 15.01[l][a][iv] (must be owner, or exercising rights granted by
owner, to have standing to sue for trade secret infringement).
160. DTMResearch, 245 F.3d at 332.
161. Whether the manufacturer would be liable for unauthorized access is debatable, of
course. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350-53 (2003) (emails sent to
corporations employees did not amount to trespass to chattels because of a lack of actual harm);
see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights And Competition On The Internet: In Search Of
An Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With
Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000).
162. MILGRIM, supra note 141, § 15.01[l].
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regarding use and ownership of the data. Further, it is not likely that
the manufacturer would be suing the consumer for misappropriation,
but rather a third party competitor, and such a competitor would have
accessed the data without the manufacturer's consent. One does not
have to be the owner of property to be able to assert a claim for
trespass; merely having possession of property entitles the person to
sue for trespass against someone whose claim is junior to the
claimant. 163 Where the manufacturer has put in place reasonable
measures to protect the secret nature of the information, a good
argument can be made that the manufacturer has a greater interest
than a competitor in the information, and therefore a right to sue for
misappropriation of that information by a competitor. Where the item
owner has not consented to the use of the information by the
competitor, a claim for misappropriation should be able to be made
out.
Of course, the situation is different where the consumer has
granted permission to the competitor to access the data. Where the
true owner of the property uses it, the possessor can make no claim.
Thus the manufacturer would have no right-at least not under trade
secret law-to prevent access to the data.
iv. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Trade secret law does not create a right in the information
itself.164 Instead, the UTSA, as well as the Restatements, makes the
misappropriation of trade secrets illegal.165  Generally, a
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 157-58 (1965); DTM Research, 245 F.3d at
332.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995)
165. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3, 14 U.L.A. 619-34 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939);
Misappropriation is defined under the UTSA as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
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misappropriation occurs when someone uses improper means to
obtain the secret information. 166 Thus, while someone may be liable
for copyright infringement even if the copying is innocent, she would
only be liable for trade secret infringement if she obtained or
disclosed secret information in an improper manner. If the person
independently discovers the information, or obtains the information
by examining publicly available products and information, she will
incur no liability under trade secret law. 167
As stated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he public at large remain[s]
free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse
engineering of products in the public domain or by independent
creation."'1 68 Its owner has no proprietary interest in the information
as such, but only to the extent the information is a secret. 169 This
raises the question of whether accessing information contained on
hardware that you own would be improper. Obviously, the consumer
could expressly agree to not access the information. But absent such
agreement, would the consumer incur any liability by accessing the
information? The key fact is likely that the manufacturer has freely
distributed the tag with the item. As noted in the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, "[i]ndependent discovery and analysis of
publicly available products or information are not improper means of
acquisition."' 170 Since it is legal to purchase a competitor's product
and reverse engineer it to determine any trade secret information, 171
the manufacturer would not have a claim against the consumer. The
Restatement provides the following example:
A sells a drug compounded from a secret formula. B, a competing
drug manufacturer, purchases a quantity of A's drug on the open
market and learns the formula through scientific analysis. B then
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1995).
166. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3, 14 U. L.A. 619-34 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
168. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995) ("The owner of a
trade secret does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret information.
Protection is available only against a wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade
secret."); DTMResearch, 245 F.3d at 332 ("The 'proprietary aspect' of a trade secret flows, not
from the knowledge itself, but from its secrecy.").
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
171. Id.§43cmt.b.
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begins to market a similar product. B has not acquired A's trade
secret by improper means.172
However, has a competitor that accesses the data on a tag owned
by the consumer used improper means? First, what if the consumer is
unaware of the access? As discussed above, the manufacturer would
have to have used reasonable means to protect the information. For
example, what if the manufacturer sets up the tag so that it does not
broadcast indiscriminately, but only when certain readers, or certain
codes, are sent to the tag? That would seem to be a reasonable means.
One court has gone so far as to hold that merely flying over a
competitor's factory, built in a remote area, amounted to improper
means. 173 However, since the competitor is free to purchase the
publicly available item and reverse engineer the tag, accessing other
tags using that information would not seem to violate trade secret law.
It is black letter law that reverse engineering a product freely
available in the market place does not violate trade secret law. 174
Even so, there are cases where a court has held that the method
of obtaining the information claimed to be secret creates liability,
even if the information itself was subject to being reverse engineered.
For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that firmware
contained on a chip embedded on microprocessor cards used in
telephone switching systems could be a trade secret, even when the
cards were sold to third parties and potentially subject to being
reverse engineered. 175 The plaintiff, DSC Communications Corp.
("DSC"), manufactured telephone switching systems. 176 As part of
an upgrade to the dialing plan required by the Federal
Communications Commission, DSC had to upgrade its operating
software, which further required DSC's customers to upgrade the
microprocessor cards used in the switching systems. 177  The
defendant, DGI Technologies, Inc. ("DGI"), sold competing cards for
DSC switching systems. 178 In order to be able to make its cards
compatible with DSC's upgraded operating system, it needed access
to the firmware on the new DSC microprocessor cards.1 79
172. Id. § 43 cmt. b, illus. 1.
173. E.I. duPont deNemours & Company v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
174. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
175. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1999).
176. Id. at 777.
177. Id. at 778.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 779.
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In order to obtain a copy of the firmware, DGI had to obtain a
copy of DSC's software, which then allowed DGI to obtain the
information about the firmware DGI needed. DGI obtained the
software by having an employee at one of its (and DSC's) customers
allow DGI to test its card in a DSC switch. 180 DGI argued that
because it was not under any contractual obligation to DSC, and the
employee willingly let DGI test out its card, DGI had not used
improper means to obtain access to the information contained in
DSC's firmware, and had merely engaged in legally permissible
reverse engineering. 181 However, the court rejected this argument,
holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the lower court's
finding that obtaining the software in this way amounted to a
misappropriation. In particular, the court felt that DGI used its
relationship with the employee, who was susceptible to being
hoodwinked, into granting access to the operating software without
fully understanding DGI's purpose. 182 As a result, DGI was then able
to use "the knowledge it gained from the purloined software to
interpret the trade secrets contained in DSC's firmware." 183 Thus, the
court focused on the means used to access the information, without
fully analyzing whether the firmware was truly secret. What was
determinative was that DGI used improper means, which are
generally "'means which fall below the generally accepted standards
of commercial morality and reasonable conduct."'' 184
Thus, it is possible that a court would hold that accessing the
data on the tag without the permission of the manufacturer amounts to
misappropriation of trade secrets. The key issue will be the means
employed. If the tag freely broadcasts its contents as soon as it passes
close to a reader, this would likely not be improper means. However,
if the competitor had to circumvent a password and decrypt the data,
perhaps this would be seen to violate generally accepted standards of
commercial conduct.
6. Unfair Competition Law
It is generally accepted that there is a right to compete, and that
no liability should arise merely from causing harm to someone's
180. Id. at 784-85.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 785.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting duPont, 431 F.2dat 1016).
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business by competing with them. 185 Absent some specific law
limiting rights in an intangible asset, such as trademarks or trade
secrets, a competitor normally would not incur liability merely by
aggressively pursuing a competitor's business. 186 Nevertheless, the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does allow for claims to
be brought based on a more generalized theory of "unfair
competition." 187
The Restatement states that such liability is based upon "other
acts or practices of the actor determined to be actionable as an unfair
method of competition, taking into account the nature of the conduct
and its likely effect on both the person seeking relief and the
public."'1 88 The key is that the kinds of conduct that would be
actionable depend on their nature and their effect on competition. The
comments to this section of the Restatement note that such practices
must hinder competition, negatively affecting the efficient working of
the marketplace. 189 However, Professor McCarthy, in his treatise on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition Law, states that "[c]ourts have
little success in defining unfair competition in the abstract, and often
resort to statements such as '[t]he controlling question... is whether
the acts complained of are fair or unfair.'"1
90
A claim of unfair competition does not directly create a property
right in the data; 191 instead, it attempts to redress forms of
competition that are "too hard." Since no fixed standard exists for
determining what constitutes unfair competition, it is difficult to say
for certain whether a competitor accessing data on a tag will be
considered just a form of robust competition, 192 or an act that falls
below minimum commercial standards of fair play, although the
former is the most likely outcome.
185. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
186. Id. See, also, ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc. 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("In general, if information is not a trade secret and is not protected by patent,
copyright, or some other body of law that creates a broader intellectual property right than trade
secrecy does, anyone is free to use the information without liability.").
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
188. Id.
189. Id. at §1 cmt. g.
190. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW § 1:8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. g (1995).
191. Id. ("Unfair competition is not an objective 'thing' and has no objective reality. It is
merely an intellectual concept convenient to describe a process which goes on in courts of
law.").
192. See, e.g., M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 612 P.2d 241, 246 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980) (taking other sales person's call not unfair where motive was not solely to harm
competitor).
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7. Tort of Misappropriation
The Restatement recognizes a tort of appropriation of trade
values, which, in addition to liability for appropriation of trade secrets
or violation of the right of publicity, also provides liability where the
"appropriation is actionable by the other under federal or state statutes
or international agreements, or is actionable as a breach of contract, or
as an infringement of common law copyright as preserved under
federal copyright law."' 193 According to the official comments to this
provision, the common law tort of appropriation is a limited tort that
only provides a cause of action where an intangible trade value is
clearly defined by some other law. "In the absence of such additional
interests, the common law has resisted the recognition of general
rights against the appropriation of information and other intangible
trade values." 194 Since there is no specific recognition of rights in
databases in the U.S., or automatically generated data in particular, it
is not likely that a court would rely on this section to grant relief to a
manufacturer.
The related tort of "misappropriation" grew out of the Supreme
Court case, International News Service v. Associated Press.195 The
case centered around the use of hot news, gathered by the Associated
Press and published in early editions of its members' east coast
newspapers. International News Service then took that information,
and republished it on the west coast, sometimes even before the
Associated Press's members had a chance to publish the news in their
own papers. 196  The Court found this to be a form of unfair
competition, where one competitor took advantage of the time, effort
and expense of another, allowing it to "reap where it has not sown,"
which the Court held should not be tolerated by the courts. 197
Use of data created by another, in a manner that permits the
competitor to free ride on the efforts of the manufacturer, would
appear to fall squarely within the misappropriation doctrine described
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38(c) (1995).
194. Id. at § 38 cmt. b.
195. Int'l. News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
196. Id. at 238-39.
197. Id. at 239-40:
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference
with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at the
point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the
profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special
advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not
burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news.
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by the Supreme Court. However, although the tort is broadly defined
in the International News case, the doctrine is not likely to be applied
to the use by a competitor of data contained on a tag owned by a
consumer. First, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
rejects the reasoning of the International News case, because of the
potentially negative impact such a tort would have on competition
generally. 198  Thus, any court applying the reasoning of the
Restatement would likely not find there to be a tort of
misappropriation. 199
Second, courts have generally limited the doctrine to the facts of
the original International News case,200 refusing to extend it to other
competitive situations. 20 1  The misappropriation tort's remaining
viability is generally limited to "hot news" situations, where the
information's timeliness is its value, the defendant is free riding on
that information, and allowing copying would reduce the incentive to
create the information.202 Although an argument can be made that the
copying of data off a tag is a form of free riding, which if unchecked
would create a disincentive to track data, the data on the tag would
not be time sensitive, at least in the hot news sense. Since the data
can reside on a tag for an unspecified period of time, only being
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b (1995) ("The better
approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the competing
interests, does not recognize a residual common law tort of misappropriation.").
199. See Ginsburg, supra note 72, at 158 ("Most notably, the recent Restatement (Third) of
the Law of Unfair Competition restates much of the misappropriation doctrine out of
existence.").
200. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Nat'l. Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 n.7
(2nd Cir 1997) (quoting Judge Learned Hand from the Cheney Bros. decision); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) ("The limited extent to which the INS
rationale has been incorporated into the common law of the states indicates that the decision is
properly viewed as a response to unusual circumstances rather than as a statement of generally
applicable principles of common law.").
201. See, e.g., Nat'l Basketball Ass 'n, 105 F.3d at 853-54 (transmission of near real time
sports scores of NBA games without permission of the NBA is not unlawful misappropriation of
that information).
202. Id. at 852. As described by the Second Circuit, the elements of the tort are:
(i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or expense; (ii) the
value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii) the defendant's use of the
information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiffs costly efforts to generate or
collect it; (iv) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competition with
a product or service offered by the plaintiff; (v) the ability of other parties to free-
ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce the
product or service that its existence or quality could be substantially threatened.
Id. (citations omitted). Accord ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc. 433 F.3d 952, 960
(7th Cir. 2006).
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accessed when near a reader, the manufacturer would be hard pressed
to claim that a competitor's use of that data falls under the hot news
doctrine.
Third, it is likely that a claim of misappropriation is preempted
by copyright law.2 03 The stored data comprises a compilation, a work
subject to copyright law, although likely not copyrightable as noted
above. Where a claim is made that an intangible property right has
been misappropriated, and such claimed property right falls within the
scope of copyright law, the courts have consistently held that the
Copyright Act preempts the state common law tort of
misappropriation.204  Even where courts have entertained the
possibility that a misappropriation claim based on copying
information is not preempted by the Copyright Act,205 the courts state
that a "hot news" misappropriation claim only survives because the
information's timeliness provides the extra element necessary to
avoid preemption when compared to copyright infringement. 206 Thus
a claim for "misappropriating" the data on a tag is likely to be
preempted by the copyright statute. 207
203. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (Ibreemption section of the Copyright Act).
204. Nat 7 Basketball Ass "n, 105 F.3d at 851 ("The broad misappropriation doctrine relied
upon by the district court is, therefore, the equivalent of exclusive rights in copyright law.");
Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 785-89; accord ConFold Pacific, 433 F.3d at 960 (state misappropriation
claim preempted by federal patent law).
205. Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 787 ("If, however, one or more qualitatively different elements
are required to constitute the state-created cause of action being asserted, then the right granted
under state law does not lie "within the general scope of copyright," and preemption does not
occur.").
206. Nat'l Basketball Ass 'n, 105 F.3d at 852-53. In fact, the Second Circuit stated that three
elements would have to be proven for a misappropriation's claim to avoid preemtion:
We therefore find the extra elements-those in addition to the elements of
copyright infringement-that allow a "hotnews" claim to survive preemption are:
(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service
provided by the plaintiff.
Id. at 853.
207. Cf Ginsburg, supra note 72, at 164. ("Finally, misappropriation claims, to the extent
they survive copyright preemption analysis, do not afford complete coverage of compiled
information because they are, at most, limited to time-sensitive compilations. Static
compilations, and even dynamic compilations that lack time-sensitivity, fall outside the claim's
ambit.").
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B. Ownership of Data as Derivative Work of Copyright in
Software
One of the exclusive rights under section 106 of the Copyright
Act is the right to make derivative works. 208 A derivative work is
defined in the copyright statute as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. ' '209 An
important part of this definition is that a derivative work is based
upon a preexisting work, and not merely created using such a work.
Thus the definition limits the scope of a derivative work as one that
recasts, transforms or adapts the earlier work. One test for derivative
work status is whether the new work infringes upon the original work.
If it does, then it is derivative.210
An example of a non-derivative work that relies upon an earlier
copyrighted work would be a novel written on a computer using
Microsoft Word. Clearly Word is a copyrighted software program,211
and the novel was created using Word to write the new work.
However, the novel is not a derivative work of Word, and so no
permission is needed to write the novel, and it does not infringe
Microsoft's copyrights.
In the same way, the item manufacturer cannot make a good
argument that the data is a derivative work of the software on the
chip, since it is not based upon, but only generated by, the software
that tracks the data. As discussed above, either it is not owned by
anyone, or the consumer is the owner (because the consumer is the
author) of the data.
III. OWNERSHIP OF DATA THROUGH HARDWARE
Even if the manufacturer does not own the data directly-
whether because the data is not subject to ownership by anyone, or
because the manufacturer is not the creator of the data or otherwise
directly owner of the intangible property-the manufacturer may be
able to control the data because it owns the chip in the tag. Given that
208. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
210. M.H. Segan Ltd. P'ship v. Hasbro, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
211. E.g., Microsoft Word v.X:Mac, Copyright Reg. No. TX-5-448-113 (registered Dec.
31, 2001).
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the chip (and the antenna) is a piece of tangible, personal property,
traditional rules regarding ownership of the chip would apply.
A. Who Owns the Hardware
1. Who Owns the Chip?
As described in the introduction, several advancements in
technology now permit manufacturers to embed into their goods
tracking technology that can be connected to the manufacturers'
systems via wireless networking-RFID, in short. As mentioned,
automobile manufacturers such as Lotus already build into their
products microprocessors with sufficient memory to track the
automobile's vital statistics, as in the aforementioned example of the
Lotus Elise. This permits the automobile manufacturer, through its
dealers, to better maintain and repair the car.
Before the sale to the consumer, the manufacturer owns the tag,
or in the case of a Lotus Elise, the engine control unit. This is true
because the manufacturer owned the components that went into
making the car, and after the assembly process would own the entire
car and its now-assembled components-that is, the manufacturer
would hold title to the car. Given that the manufacturer intends to
transfer possession of the car to the consumer, questions arise as to
whether transfer of title to the car requires that title to all of the
components be transferred as well.
2. UCC Article 2 Sales
In every United States jurisdiction, the sale of personal property
is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
Since automobiles are personal property, the rules about ownership
are governed by Article 2. According to section 2-401, title to the car
would pass to the consumer when the seller completes delivery of the
goods, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.212 Thus, in the
example, title to the car would transfer at the time of delivery of
possession of the car to the consumer at the dealership, even if the
certificate of title was to be delivered at a later date.213
Because the consumer has taken title to the car, such consumer
would expect to own all of the tangible components making up the
car. That is, after he or she pays for the car, that person would not
212. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (2005).
213. Id. § 2-401(2)(b).
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expect to own the engine, but only lease the computer in the engine.
The same is not true, of course, of the copyrightable programs that
run on the embedded computers. Under copyright law, those belong
to the author of such works, or to the author's assignees, unless
specifically assigned to the consumer by a signed, written agreement,
and such assignments are rare. Nevertheless, the consumer is no less
the owner of the computer merely because the tangible computer
contains intangible copyrighted software. The consumer may even
own the copy of the program installed in the car's computer.2 14
Section 2-401 states that title transfers upon physical delivery
unless the parties otherwise agree. What if the manufacturer includes
a provision in the sales documents that attempts to transfer title to the
car, but retain title to the tag? Article 2 makes it clear that any attempt
by the seller to retain title, in the case of a sale of the goods, is treated
merely as the retention of a security interest under Article 9, and not a
retention of title.2 15 Thus, if the transaction is deemed to be a sale,
then title to the entire car transfers to the consumer, and at best the
manufacturer retains a security interest in the tag.
Thus, in this example, the consumer is the owner of the tag, and
its embedded chip. This means also that the consumer owns the
physical media on which the data is stored.
B. Title to Intangible Data by Title to Tangible Chip
An interesting interplay exists between rights in tangible and
intangible property: Does ownership of tangible property entitle you
to ownership of intangible property created by that tangible
214. See, e.g., Softman Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1083-87 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (unbundling and sale of separate CDs containing Adobe software
which was originally sold as a collection not infringement under the first sale doctrine);
NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8:12[I][d][i] ("In short, the first sale defense would seem as
operational in the software setting as it is in comparable circumstances to the millions of
videotapes, books, and other physical media that have been sold."); Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property And Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1259-63 (1995).
Contra, Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058-59 (N.D. Cal.
2002); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
215. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2005). Interestingly, Article 9 specifically states that goods
includes "a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in
connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the program is associated with the
goods in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming
the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection with the
goods." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (2005).
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property? 216 Because the consumer owns the chip, one might expect
that the same consumer owns the data contained on the chip.
Title to chattels not previously owned typically is created by
taking possession. For example, wild animals are not owned by
anyone while they are in the wild, but a person becomes the owner of
such animals by possessing them. This rule, discussed in the seminal
first year property law case of Pierson v. Post, discusses the point. In
that case, the land was "wasteland," not owned by anyone.217
However, the Pierson court noted that had the hunters been on land
owned by someone, the outcome likely would have been different.
The example given was of ducks in a duck pond-where the pond is
someone's property, then title to the ducks remains in the real
property owner, ratione soli.218
Likewise, ownership of the chip and the tangible storage medium
could give ownership of the data to the consumer, at least where no
specific intellectual property law, such as copyright, determines
ownership. By owning the physical item, the consumer would own
the data contained on that chip, particularly where it is the actions of
the consumer that generate the data.
Cases discussing ownership of emails created by employees
yield much the same result-because the employer owns the system,
the employer owns whatever is contained on that system. 219 Of
course, there is an important distinction-the nature of the
relationship between the employer and employee, as opposed to that
216. Under copyright law, for example, mere ownership of a copy of a work does not grant
any rights to the copyright in the work:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement,
does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a
copyright convey property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
217. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (1805):
So also, encompassing and securing such animals with nets and toils, or
otherwise intercepting them in such a manner as to deprive them of their natural
liberty, and render escape impossible, may justly be deemed to give possession of
them to those persons who, by their industry and labour, have used such means of
apprehending them.
218. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 179.
219. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 (E.D. Pa. 1996); McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. App. Dallas May 28,
1999) (rejecting employee's argument that messages stored in company email system were
private).
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between consumer and manufacturer. The employee is an agent of the
employer and could be said to create all such information for the
benefit of his or her principal, the employer. No such principal-agent
relationship exists between a manufacturer and consumer.
In addition, if a thing is not of a type that can be owned, then
mere ownership of the land (or chip) on which the thing exists does
not create ownership in that thing. In the case of wild animals, the
animal is not owned by the landowner until the landowner has
possession. But the landowner has a better claim than a trespasser.
Likewise, the landowner cannot be said to own the air on his or her
land, as such air cannot be owned. Therefore, if the data cannot be
owned, then possession and control would not seem to invest the
consumer with ownership of the data.
However, with the chip there is a difference when compared to
air-the data is fixed in a tangible medium, namely the magnetic data
storage. Certainly, the consumer possesses that media. Since it is the
bits of information that make up the data, such as the ferrous oxide on
a cassette tape, perhaps consumer ownership of the media implies
data ownership, as well.
The recent revisions to U.C.C. Article 2 specifically exclude
"information" from the definition of goods.220 The official comment
to this section explains that this definition is meant "to exclude
information not associated with goods," such as "an electronic
transfer of information. . ".. ,,221 However, where the transaction
involves both goods and information, the drafters decided to leave it
to the courts to determine whether Article 2 applies to the transaction
in whole, in part or not at all. 222 Therefore, no answer is provided
220. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(k) (2005). For a discussion of the difficult revision process for
Article 2, see generally Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The
Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999).
221. U.C.C. § 2-103 cmt. 6 (2005) (citing Specht v. Netscape, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 306 F.3d 17 (2d. Cir. 2002) as an example).
222. Id. See also Linda J. Rusch, Is The Saga Of The Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
Revisions Over? A Brief Look At What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REV. 41, 45
(2003):
Drawing the line between what constituted a good that contains a computer
program but is not a computer or computer peripheral (and hence a "smart good"
that should be covered by Article 2) and a good that contains a computer program
but is a computer or computer peripheral was finally acknowledged to be
impossible in the spring of 2002 after numerous attempts to draw the line....
... When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and the transfer of rights
in information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is
entirely within or outside of this Article, or whether or to what extent this Article
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under revised Article 2 as to whether ownership of a tangible good
includes ownership of the information imbedded in that good.
Nor does the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA"), the uniform law that came out of the attempts to revise
Article 2 during the 1990s, 223 take a position on "smart goods."
UCITA was intended to create a uniform law of computer information
transactions, 224  which are defined as "an agreement or the
performance of it to create, modify, transfer, or license computer
information or informational rights in computer information. '225 The
typical form of transaction covered by UCITA is a license for
software and computer information. 226
UCITA is only intended to cover transactions in computer
information, although provision is made for "mixed transactions. '227
Where the transactions include both computer information and goods,
UCITA generally applies to that part of the transaction that deals with
information, and other law, such as Article 2, applies to the rest of the
transaction.228 However, where the goods sold include embedded
computer programs which are "contained in and sold or leased as part
of goods,"229 then UCITA does not apply to the transaction. 230 The
comments to this section go on to explain that "this Act excludes a
copy of the computer program if the copy is embedded in, inseparable
from, and sold or leased as an indistinguishable part of goods. '231
Examples of where UCITA would not apply are chips contained in
toasters, and the programs that control the braking functions of an
automobile. 232 Thus, instead of providing a solution to ownership
and control of information contained on a tag, UCITA excludes the
kind of transactions in which embedded tags would be at issue.
should be applied to a portion of the transaction. While this Article may apply to
a transaction including information, nothing in this Article alters, creates, or
diminishes intellectual property rights.
Id.
223. Rusch, supra note 220, at 1686-87.
224. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(a) (2001).
225. Id. § 102(a)(ll).
226. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT prefatory note.
227. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(b) (2001).
228. Id. at § 103(b)(1) and cmt. 4.
229. Id.
230. Id. There are two exceptions: "(A) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral;
or (B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the program is ordinarily a
material purpose of transactions in goods of the type sold or leased." Id. § 103(b)(1)(A)-(B).
23 1. Id. at cmt. 4(b)(3).
232. Id.
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C. Bailment
The transfer of the chip to the consumer could be a bailment. A
bailment is a transfer of possession of personal property from a bailor
to a bailee, without transfer of title to such property to the bailee, and
is based upon a delivery of the personal property to the bailee for a
specific purpose.233 One key element that distinguishes a bailment
from a sale of personal property is that title does not transfer, but
instead remains with the bailor. The bailee has an obligation to restore
the property to the bailor, in the same or some altered form. If the
bailee does not need to restore the same property, then the cases have
held that the transaction is a sale. 234
Two main definitions of bailment exist. The first is more
restrictive, requiring there to be a contractual agreement to the
bailment. As stated by Justice Story in his treatise on bailments, "a
bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or
purpose, and upon a contract, express or implied, to conform to the
object or purpose of the trust.' '235 Professor Williston suggests a
second, broader definition, stating that a bailment is "the rightful
possession of good by one who is not the owner. '236 Although a
question exists about whether a contract is necessary for a
bailment, 237 a common element between these definitions is the need
for a delivery of the personal property. 238
In order to establish that a bailment exits, the bailee has to have
actual, physical control of the property, and an intent to possess the
property. The physical control element is likely not a stumbling block
for the possession of the data on the chip, because the consumer will
have control over the entire physical item, and thus physical control
over the chip embedded in the item. As a result, this element of
bailment is met.
233. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 2 (2005).
234. See, e.g., Wilson v. Brawn of California, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 4th 549, 558 (2005); 8
C.J.S. Bailments § 9 (2005).
235. JOSEPH STORY, LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2 (Cambridge, Hilliard & Brown 1832); see
also RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.1 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed.,
1975)
236. 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1030 (3d ed. 1967). See
also BROWN, supra note 235, § 10.1.
237. See BROWN, supra note 235, § 10.1. Justice Story discussed a similar point in a later
edition of his book, criticizing the argument that not every bailment was supported by a contract.
See STORY, supra note 235, § 2 n.2.
238. See also 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 2 (2005). Justice Story noted that the term bailment
comes from the French word bailler, "which signifies to deliver." STORY, supra note 235, § 2.
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The second element requires intent to exercise control over the
item. 239 Again, there is clearly an intent to possess the item, because
the consumer purchased it. Thus, the consumer intends to exercise
control over the item, which would logically include all of the
constituent parts of the item. Of course, a problem with this is that the
consumer intended to take title to the item, and this would weigh
against the finding of a bailment because the consumer did not intend
merely to take possession, but also to take title. Many bailment cases
emphasize that both parties must intend that the bailee receive
possession with an obligation to return it. For example, where a
woman delivered a coat with a fur piece concealed inside, the court
held that the defendant dance hall was not liable when the fur turned
up missing, because the defendant had not intended to take possession
of the fur.240 Of course, this case hinged on the lack of delivery and
acceptance of the fur, but is based upon the concept that a bailment
arises out of a contract, and since there was no meeting of the minds,
no bailment was created.
There are also cases where a bailee was not held liable for the
theft of items stored in a trunk of a car, even where there was a
bailment of the car. The defendant was not liable because he was
unaware that the property was in the trunk, and so no bailment
existed. Of course, a bailee will be liable for items he or she should
expect to be in the property, such as luggage, but this hinges on what
the bailee would reasonably be assumed to know about the contents
of the property bailed. 241
1. Bailment Versus Sale
Treating the transfer of the tag embedded in the item as a
bailment has distinct advantages for the manufacturer. Because title
has not transferred, the consumer is merely in lawful possession of the
tag, rather than the owner of the tag. This would give the
manufacturer a stronger argument that the consumer's use of the tag
is limited by the contractual nature of the bailment. Assuming a
bailment exists, the terms of that bailment are set by the agreement
between the manufacturer and the consumer, and may include
contractual terms limiting the consumer's rights to use the data. 242
239. Brown, supra note 235, § 10.3
240. Samples v. Geary, 292 S.W. 1066 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
241. BROWN, supra note 235, §120.3.
242. See infra for a discussion of contractual rights to the data.
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However, in order for this argument to succeed, the
manufacturer must argue that the transfer of the tag amounted only to
a bailment, and not a sale. This can only be true if the rule of UCC 2-
401(1)-that an attempted retention of title in the goods delivered by
the seller to the consumer is merely a security interest and not
retention of title--does not apply. The manufacturer would argue that
there are two transactions, one for the sale of goods, and the other for
the bailment of the tag.
The UCC does not do away with the law of bailments.243 If the
manufacturer does not intend to part with title, it may be a bailment
for hire, which is covered under Article 2A Leases, 244 or some other
form of bailment, such as involuntary or gratuitous bailment. For any
of these arguments to succeed, however, the manufacturer must
intend to retain title, and most courts considering whether a party
intended to retain title hold that the party must intend to receive back
the exact same item. 245 If the party will receive either different
property, or similar property but not the same item, then it is a sale
and not a bailment. In some cases, the courts have allowed the bailee
to make changes to the item and still have the relationship function as
a bailment, but in those cases it is the same item being returned, albeit
transformed from its original state when the bailee first received it.
This creates problems for the manufacturer, because the tag is
attached to an item that has been sold, and the manufacturer does not
intend to ever get the item back. Title has clearly transferred to the
consumer for the item. In order for the manufacturer to create a
bailment of the tag, it must establish two separate transactions: sale of
the item, no return intended; and bailment of the tag, return intended.
This is of course theoretically possible-there is nothing illegal about
two parties entering into a contractual relationship where one party is
both selling some goods, and leasing other goods. However, in order
for that contractual setting to exist, the parties must both intend it.
Even if the manufacturer attempts to establish such a relationship by
using the correct terminology in the contract, a court is free to look
243. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. k ("The provisions of this Article, if applicable,
determine whether a lease agreement has legal consequences; otherwise the law of bailments
and other applicable law determine the same.").
244. U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. j ("At common law a lease of personal property is a bailment
for hire ... ").
245. In re Porter, 202 B.R. 109, 115 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Payberg v. Harris, 931 P.2d 544, 545
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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past the form of the agreement to its actual substance.246 And if the
manufacturer in fact does not intend to get the tag back, a court will
likely hold that title transferred, and that the putative bailment of the
tag was really a sale.
In addition, if the manufacturer were able to show that two
separate contractual arrangements were made regarding the item and
the embedded tag, it would have to establish a working method of
retrieving the tag. This in and of itself likely would cost so much that
the system would be unsustainable.
2. Article 2A Lease of Chip
Take the other extreme: The consumer has leased the car. Under
most car lease agreements, the manufacturer or its agent, the dealer, is
the owner of the car. Assuming that the car will retain a significant
portion of its value at the end of the lease, it will be respected as a
true lease under Article 2, rather than being deemed to be a sale.247
As a result, the consumer does not own the chip, let alone the
software. The tag, the chip and the transmitter are all still the property
of the dealer.
Does that mean that the dealer is the owner of the data? Again,
although the dealer (treated the same as the manufacturer for this
purpose) has made tracking the use and vital statistics of the car
possible, it is the lessee's operation of the car that actually creates the
database. Does the fact that the dealer still owns the car change the
analysis?
An Article 2A lease is just a species of bailment-a bailment for
hire. 248 In order for a transaction in goods to be a lease governed by
Article 2A, it must meet the relevant definition: "a transfer of the
right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for
consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or
return, retention or creation of a security interest, or license of
246. See, e.g., Atlas Industries, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 219-20
(1975) (although documents stated transaction was a lease, court ruled that substance of
agreement was a sale of goods).
247. U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt.j. (2005).
248. U.C.C. § 2A-103 (2005):
At common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for hire. While there
are several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and a price
for the letting. Thus, in modem terms and as provided in this definition, a lease is
created when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the
possession and use of goods over a specified period of time.
Id. (citing Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 BUS. LAW.
1605, 1607 (1981)).
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information is not a lease. ' 249 As with bailments generally, the
transaction is either a sale or a lease, but not both. The key limitation
is that a lease is a right of possession over a specified period. 250 This
distinguishes the lease from bailments generally, which have no time
period.
As discussed above, title does not pass to the lessee under a
lease. 251 If the substance of the transaction is intended as a lease the
manufacturer would have a stronger claim to the data. At least the
manufacturer could claim an interest in the data that flowed from
ownership of the hardware. However, as seen above, mere ownership
of the hardware would not make the manufacturer the author for
copyright purposes, nor would the manufacturer be in direct
possession of the information for trade secret purposes. Even so, a
claim against a competitor would at least be bolstered, where the
manufacturer could now claim some interest in the tag.
3. Obligations and Liability of Bailee
If the manufacturer can establish that a bailment was created,
this would generally make the consumer liable for the loss or
destruction of the tag. If the manufacturer does not hold the bailee
liable for any loss or damage, then this would constitute evidence that
title had passed. Three different levels of duty of care are imposed on
a bailee under the common law, depending on the nature of the
bailment. If the bailment is mutually beneficial to both bailor and
bailee, then the bailee is bound to use ordinary diligence in the care of
the item, and is liable when negligent in that care. 252 A bailment for
hire, such as a lease of personal property, would be such a
circumstance. 253 If the bailment is solely for the benefit of the bailor,
then the bailee only has a slight duty of care, and is only liable for
gross negligence. 254 Examples include the gratuitous bailee, who
receives no compensation or other benefit from keeping the item.
Keeping an item for the safekeeping of the bailor is an example. 255
Where the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee, then the bailee
has a great duty of care, and is liable even for slight negligence. 256
249. Id. § 2A-103(l)(p).
250. Id. § 2A-103 cmt. (j).
251. Id.
252. BROWN, supra note 235, § 11.2.
253. Id. § 11.1.
254. Id. § 11.4.
255. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 17 (2005).
256. BROWN, supra note 235, § 11.3.
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This is often characterized as a "loan" of goods, or friendly
borrowing. 257
While the bailee is never held to be the insurer of the goods,258
so that some proof of negligence is necessary under any of these
standards, 259 under the circumstances of the sale of an item an
associated bailment of the tag would at most be considered a bailment
for mutual benefit of the parties, and perhaps even a gratuitous
bailment.
IV. "VIRTUAL" OWNERSHIP THROUGH ACCESS CONTROL
Although the data may not be owned directly by the
manufacturer, the manufacturer may choose to limit access to the data
through technological means. Two likely limits on accessing the data
would be password control to access the chip, and encryption of the
data on the chip.
A. Technological Limits to Access
The EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (gen 2) standard for RFID
chips provides that a manufacturer may control access to the tag
through a 32-bit encrypted password. Establishing encryption as part
of the standard allows every chip the capability to restrict access to its
data.260 Thus the protocol developed by EPCglobal includes a method
of limiting access to the data contained on the tag by password
protecting the tag. The specification also contains protocols for
encrypting the data being transmitted, including the EPC, by "cover-
coding" the transmitted data. 261
Assuming that these technological choices by EPCglobal are
effective at preventing access to the tag, they may prove to be more
useful in preventing the copying and use of the data than legal
regimes such as copyright or trade secret law. These methods have the
added benefit of preventing copying and use regardless of whether the
underlying data is itself protected by any of the legal schemes
described above.
However, as been made clear over the last decade, oftentimes
such attempts to prevent access have met with limited success. For
257. Id. at § 11.1, 11.3; see also 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 18.
258. BROWN, supra note 235, § 11.1.
259. Id. at § 11.3.
260. CLAsS-I GENERATION-2 UHF RFID PROTOCOL FOR COMMUNICATION 36 (EPCglobal
Jan. 2005).
261. Id. at 44.
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example, the encryption system on a DVD, the Content-Scrambling
System (CSS), was cracked by a 15 year old Norwegian student
named Jon Johansen (colloquially referred to as "DVD Jon"). One
version of the program to descramble a DVD, DeCSS, can be written
in only 7 lines of code. 262 DeCSS is a 40-bit cipher, which is
generally considered to be a very weak level of encryption. 263 Yet the
cipher included in the gen 2 protocol is only 32 bits. Even the first
attempt at encryption for wireless 802.1 lb transmission, the Wireless
Encryption Protocol (WEP), which can be set for 128-bit encryption,
can be broken in minutes with the right software. 264 Therefore, it is
likely, given the right tools, that someone will devise a way to quickly
and easily circumvent the encryption systems built into the current
gen 2 protocol.
Of course, with the development of more sophisticated tags, such
as the fully active Class 4 tags anticipated by EPCglobal, the
encryption systems will likely become more sophisticated, possibly
even providing for the real time encryption of the data on the chip
itself, and not just when sending the data to the reader. Also, stronger
ciphers will be used to communicate with the readers, much like how
the 802.11 encryption system has migrated from WEP to WPA and
WPA2.
B. Legal Limits to Access
Instead of creating liability for the copying or accessing of the
data, legal limits may also be placed on access to the data, where such
access can include eavesdropping on the transmission of data, or
causing the data to be transmitted by the tag. The U.S. government
has taken steps to make accessing data and capturing transmissions
and communications illegal.
262. Declan McCullagh, Descramble That DVD in 7 Lines, WIRED, Mar. 7, 2001, available
at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,42259,00.html. See also Gallery of CSS
Descramblers, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dstIDeCSS/Gallery/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2006)
(extensive site discussing many permutations of DeCSS).
263. See, e.g., William A. Hodkowski, The Future Of Internet Security: How New
Technologies Will Shape The Internet And Affect The Law, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 217, 234 (1997) ("[Blecause of modem technology, symmetric encryption
using 40-bit keys offers virtually no protection against brute-force attacks.").
264. Humphrey Cheung, The Feds Can Own Your WLAN Too, TOM'S NETWORKING, Mar.
31, 2005, http://www.tomsnetworking.com/Sections-articleI 11 -page2.php.
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1. DMCA
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted in
1998 to deal with the burgeoning illegal digital duplication of
copyrighted works. 265 In order to address the problem of protecting
copyrights of digital works in the age of the Internet,266 the federal
government put into place three legal restrictions on the
circumvention of technological measures to protect a copyrighted
work, making it illegal: first, to circumvent a technological measure
which controls access to a work;267 second, to traffic in a technology,
product, service or device that assists in circumventing the access
control;268 and third, to traffic in a technology, product, service or
device that assists in circumventing a technology that effectively
protects a right in a work under copyright. 269
All three of these prohibitions are limited by their language to
circumventing technological means controlling access to a work
protected under copyright law. Thus, it is not illegal to circumvent an
access control which is limiting access to a work not protected by
copyright. This limitation clearly reduces the scope of § 1201(a)(1),
the provision which prohibits circumvention of access controls. For
example, it would not be illegal for the owner of the media to de-
encrypt an encrypted copy of a Shakespeare play under this provision.
However, just because it is legally permissible to break the
encryption on a work of Shakespeare does not imply that it is also
legal to traffic in such decryption technology. Although the
trafficking provisions of § 1201(a)(2) also include a reference to "a
work protected under this title," 270 selling such technology likely is
still illegal. 271 This is because if the circumvention technology is
"primarily designed" for accessing copyrighted works, then it is still
265. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
266. See generally USPTO WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (Sept.
1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ ("The merger of computer
and communications technology into an integrated information technology has made possible
the development of the National Information Infrastructure which will generate both
unprecedented challenges and important opportunities for the copyright marketplace.").
267. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
268. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2000).
270. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2000).
271. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation For The "Digital Millennium", 23
Colum.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 144-48 (1999).
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illegal, even though it also can be used to access public domain
works. 272
The same result occurs with the § 1201(b) rules-if the
technology is designed "primarily" to circumvent a technological
protection of a right conferred by copyright (such as the right to copy,
distribute, or publicly perform the work), then it does not matter if it
can also be used to copy, distribute or publicly perform a public
domain work.273
With respect to the data contained on the tag, as discussed above
it is unlikely that the EPC or the data will be protected under
copyright law. Thus, unlike the cases finding liability for "cracking"
DVDs, where the technology was used almost exclusively to access
copyrighted content, in the case of RFID it would not be illegal to
circumvent the access controls in an RFID tag, such as the password
control built into the gen 2 protocol.
Even so, it may still be illegal to traffic in the technology that
permits access to such information. If the devices or technology
distributed to access the data were of the same type used to access
copyrighted works, then the distributor would run afoul of the anti-
trafficking rules. 274 In fact, it is illegal even to manufacture, import,
offer to the public, or provide such technology, let alone traffic in
it.275
2. ECPA
Because the tag transmits radio signals to communicate with the
reader, in order to retrieve the data a competitor would have to
"eavesdrop" on that communication. As a result, a competitor
accessing the data by intercepting an electronic communication or
accessing information stored about such communication must be
concerned about violating the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA).276 The ECPA is a complex statute to understand, so
272. Id.
273. Ginsburg, supra note 271, at 152:
If the circumvention device (etc.) is designed for or can be put to commercially
significant fair use, then it is not a violation of § 1201(b) to sell the device or to
offer the circumvention service. Here, as in the case of circumventions of access
controls, however, the device itself probably cannot distinguish between
circumventions for fair use purposes, and circumventions aimed simply at
obtaining unauthorized copies.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 101-303,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3121-3126
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much so that the Fifth Circuit has noted that "[u]nderstanding the Act
requires understanding and applying its many technical terms as
defined by the Act, as well as engaging in painstaking, methodical
analysis." 277
The ECPA makes illegal two different acts relating to an
electronic communication. 278 First, it is illegal under Title I of the
ECPA to intentionally intercept an electronic communication. 279
Second, it is illegal under Title II of the ECPA to obtain access to a
stored electronic communication without authorization, 280 Title II is
commonly referred to as the Stored Communications Act,281 which
was added to the ECPA's amendments to the Wiretap Act to address
issues relating to unlawful access to communications such as
email. 282 Both of these restrictions create criminal 283 and civil
liability.284
On the surface, it would seem that intercepting a communication
from a tag to a reader, or accessing data stored on a tag, would fall
under such legal restrictions. However, there are several arguments
why such acts are not illegal under the ECPA when they relate to
RFID tags.
First, in order for a transmission of data from a tag to a reader to
fall under Titles I and II of the ECPA, it must be an "electronic
communication" as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 2510. Electronic
(2000)) (hereinafter ECPA). Title I of the ECPA, §§ 101-111, regulates the interception of
communications under the ECPA; Title II of the ECPA, §§ 201-202, governs accessing
information stored on an electronic communication facility.
277. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.1994).
278. It is also illegal under the ECPA to install a pen register or trap and trace device to
discover a telephone number dialed without a court order. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000). "Basically,
a pen register is a device or process which records the telephone numbers of outgoing calls; the
trap and trace device captures the telephone numbers of incoming calls." In re Application for
Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747,
749 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3127). However, since a tag is not a telephone, such
restrictions are not relevant to this discussion.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000). This section further makes use, disclosure or other
related activity with an intercepted electronic communication illegal. Id. § 241 l(1)(b)-(e).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2000).
281. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 81 (1st Cir. 2005).
282. Id. at 80-81. See also Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide To The Stored Communications
Act, AndA Legislator's Guide To Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
283. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (2000) (criminal liability for intercepting an electronic
communication); 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (2000) (criminal liability for illegal obtaining stored
electronic communication).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5) (2000) (civil liability for intercepting an electronic
communication); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2000) (civil liability for illegal obtaining stored
electronic communication).
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communication is generally defined as "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce. '285  While transferring data by radio
communications is general covered by this definition, specifically
excluded is "any communication from a tracking device (as defined in
section 3117 of [Title 18])."286 Section 3117 defines a tracking device
as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object. '287 In many earlier cases,
tracking devices were often referred to as "beepers. ' 288 However, as
noted in a recent federal district court opinion,
Aside from its welcome brevity, the definition is striking for its
breadth. Note that a device is covered even though it may not have
been intended or designed to track movement; it is enough if the
device merely "permits" tracking. Nor does the definition suggest
that a covered device can have no function other than tracking
movement. 289
Given that an RFID tag was primarily designed for the purpose
of tracking individual items, it would seem to clearly fall under the
definition of a tracking device. Even though the active tags may also
store information unrelated tracking the location of the tag, as noted
by the district court, so long as the tag permits tracking, it is a
tracking device. 290
As a result, it is likely that the ECPA would not apply to a
communication to or from a tag. So, for example, if a competitor were
somehow to intercept and use the transmission of data from a tag to a
reader, this would not violate Title 1.291 This is true even if the nature
of the communication has nothing to do with tracking, because the
exclusion covers any communication from a tracking device. This
also means that accessing information on the tag would not violate the
285. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2000).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000).
288. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 707 (1984); Michael v. United States, 454 U.S. 950, 950 (1981); Miroyan v. United States,
439 U.S. 1338, 1340 (1978).
289. In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753-54 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting the government's argument
that a tracking device is limited to "one-way radio 'homing' devices").
290. Id. at 753.
291. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)-(e) (2000).
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Stored Communications Act, because you have to "obtain[], alter[], or
prevent[] authorized access to a[n] ... electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage. ' '292
Second, even if the communication between the reader and the
tag would be an electronic communication, the data on the tag is not
protected. The ECPA defines an electronic communication as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted .... ,,293 While the data is stored
on the chip, it is not a communication, it is just data. Thus, accessing
the tag to obtain the data would not violate the Stored
Communications Act because the data would not be a stored
communication. 294 Nor is it likely that the data would be "in
electronic storage" while on the tag, because only temporary storage
of the transmission while in transit, or backup storage of an electronic
communication, is included in that definition. 295
C. Limited Statutory Responses to RFID and Other Embedded
Technology
1. RFID Right to Know Legislation
There are legislative movements to require merchants attaching
RFID tags to their products to provide notice to consumers. California
and Utah proposed, but ultimately did not pass, such legislation. 296
C.A.S.P.I.A.N., a consumer advocacy group that is actively fighting
the use of RFID tags on products, has proposed a federal law, entitled
the "RFID Right to Know Act of 2003," which requires labeling of all
products that contain tags. 297
292. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000). Exclusion of a tag from the definition of electronic
communication also precludes application of other parts of the Stored Communications Act
regarding stored communications held by a "remote computing service," because to be such a
service one must to provide "computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2000). Since an electronic communications
system "means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications," 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000), this prevents application to RFID
tags.
293. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
294. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2) (2000).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000). See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 79 ("We conclude that the
term 'electronic communication' includes transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the
communication process for such communications.").
296. Reuven, et al., RF1D, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Law, RFID JOURNAL, Feb.
14, 2005, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1401/1/128/.
297. RFID Right to Know Act of 2003, available at
http://www.nocards.org/rfid/rfidbillsummary.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
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CONCLUSION
Determining the ownership of, or proprietary rights in, data
contained on embedded tracking technology presents several difficult
factual issues. First, while the merchant creates the unique identifier
(the EPC), all of the other data tracked are generated by the actions of
the consumer. Again, this is different from the typical claim where the
party asserting an interest (the merchant) is responsible for the
creation of the data, or at least its compilation. Second, because the
data are generally compiled automatically by a system predetermined
by the merchant, it is not likely that the merchant can establish a valid
claim of copyright in a compilation of that data. Third, because the
data is contained on a tag embedded in an item of personal property
owned by a consumer, it is likely that the consumer owns the tag. As
a result, the circumstance can be distinguished from situations where
the party claiming proprietary rights in the data owns the hardware.
Even if neither copyright law nor property law gave rights to the
merchant in the data, it may be that the merchant can control data
through other means, such as claiming a trade secret interest in the
data, at least to the extent that he or she has taken reasonable steps to
limit access. However, this would create an unusual claim of trade
secret rights, where the merchant is claiming an interest in data
contained on a tag owned by a consumer, generated automatically by
the tag. While the definition of trade secret may not exclude such a
possibility, neither is it clearly supported by the cases considering
trade secrets, or by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
The merchant may be able to circumvent these legal hurdles
through technological means, by using encryption and password
protection systems for accessing the data. It may be that to the extent
that a merchant can claim that such technological protections could be
used to protect a copyrighted work, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act would prohibit competitors from accessing the information.
However, this would require an application of the DMCA to protect
information that is likely not itself copyrightable, because in theory
the technology could protect a copyrighted work. This would require
an extension of the DMCA and its anti-circumvention provisions
beyond what the courts have currently been inclined to grant.
In sum, it is likely that a merchant will have little luck in
claiming proprietary rights in the data contained in embedded
tracking technology.
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